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MORAL CONTEXT AND RISKS OF DEATH
Dov Waisman
When an industry poses a risk of premature death to consumers,
workers, or others, regulatory agencies employ a figure known as the
“value of a statistical life” (VSL) to monetize the life-saving benefit of
regulations designed to reduce that risk. Use of the VSL, which
currently hovers around $9 million, has been highly controversial.
While a number of prominent scholars have vigorously endorsed the
VSL as necessary to the cost-benefit analysis of mortality risk
regulations, other prominent scholars have vehemently rejected the
very idea of attaching a monetary value to a statistical human life.
This article stakes out a novel and more nuanced position based
on a largely neglected aspect of mortality risk regulation: moral
context. Consumption risks—risks of death associated with using or
consuming a particular product—typically fall on consumers who not
only benefit meaningfully from the industry but who also bear all or
substantially all of the costs of risk-reducing regulations. Using a VSL
to guide risk regulation in this moral context is defensible on the basis
of the norm of personal autonomy. By contrast, workplace risks—risks
of death associated with employment in a particular industry—typically
fall on workers who benefit from the industry but who do not bear the
costs of risk-reducing regulations. In this moral context, using a VSL
to guide risk regulation is not normatively defensible. However, using
the underlying economic concept of willingness-to-pay to guide the
regulation of workplace mortality risks is defensible on the basis of the
norm of equity.

Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. A.B. Harvard College. M.A.,
Philosophy, U.C. San Diego. J.D., U.C.L.A. I am indebted to Al Calnan, Michael Dorff,
Bryant Garth, Warren Grimes, Danni Hart, Jeff Helmreich, Aaron James, Greg Keating,
Hila Keren, Gowri Ramachandran, Ken Simons, Byron Stier, John Tehranian, and Tracy
Turner for their feedback and support. Of course, any errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
Operating power plants, refining oil into gasoline,
constructing large buildings, manufacturing pharmaceuticals,
pesticide-based agriculture—these are all prominent examples of
industrial activities that, despite their important social benefits,
pose significant risks of premature death to human beings.
Indeed, one of the defining features of the modern world has been
the proliferation of industries that deliver profound, lifeimproving benefits to millions at the cost of imposing low, but
nontrivial, risks of death on consumers, workers, or bystanders.
Not surprisingly, the twentieth century saw the creation of an
array of federal agencies tasked with regulating industrial
mortality risks in their respective jurisdictions.1
Since the first Reagan administration, the dominant
theoretical framework for federal risk regulation has been costbenefit analysis (CBA).2 According to CBA, a regulation should
be issued only if its total benefits exceed its total costs,3 and
regulatory levels (e.g., permissible exposure levels to toxic
substances) should be set with the goal of maximizing net
benefits.4 Because standard CBA is founded on a quantitative
comparison of costs to benefits, an obvious problem arises when
the costs and benefits of a regulation take different forms. When
the costs of a regulation are monetary, but the benefits consist in
1. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Transportation and
Highway Safety Administration (NHTSA), Occupational Health and Safety Administration
(OSHA), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are the most prominent ones.
2. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981) (requiring federal
agencies to perform CBA for all major regulations). Similar orders have been issued by
subsequent administrations. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4,
1993) (President Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011)
(President Obama).
3. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 2 (2006) (“To simplify greatly, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) requires the
regulatory agency to sum up the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation, and issue the
regulation if the benefits exceed the costs.”). For a more technical statement of this point,
see MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 88-91 (2012).
4. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1190 (2014) (“Cost-benefit analysis, in
its most general form, places both costs and benefits along a common metric and supports
the standard that maximizes net benefits (the difference between benefits and costs).”); cf.
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 68 (noting CBA is “a plausible candidate to be the
welfare-maximizing procedure as against currently available alternative procedures”).
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the prevention of some number of premature deaths, how do
regulators decide whether the regulation is cost-justified? The
answer is that regulators convert the life-saving benefits of the
regulation into the same currency as its costs by monetizing the
benefit of avoiding premature death.5 When the benefits of a
regulation include the reduction of a mortality risk—and,
therefore, the avoidance of some number of premature deaths that
would otherwise have been statistically expected to occur—
regulators have conducted CBA with reference to what has come
to be known as the value of a statistical life (VSL).6 The VSL—
which currently hovers around $9 million7—represents the
primary vehicle by which federal regulatory agencies have
monetized the benefits of regulations that reduce risks of death.
The use of the VSL to guide mortality risk regulation has
been highly controversial. A number of prominent scholars have
vehemently rejected the very idea of attaching a monetary value
5. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61 (2004) (“The most significant
benefits of environmental protection are often the deaths prevented by regulation. To decide
whether the benefits of regulation are larger or smaller than the costs, it is essential to assign
a dollar value to lives saved.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE
REGULATORY STATE 85 (2014) (“We have seen that in order to conduct cost-benefit
analysis, agencies must assign monetary values to the human lives that would be saved by a
proposed regulation.”); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7,
63 (1998) (“[P]erhaps the most significant objection to cost-benefit analysis is the inability
of economic analysis to reduce the benefits of regulation to dollar equivalents to compare
with regulatory costs.”).
6. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 67 (“The standard economic
response is that a value like $6.1 million is not a price on an individual’s life or death. Rather,
it is a way of expressing the value of small risks of death, which, when aggregated to produce
one death, can be called a ‘statistical life’; for example, the value of one statistical life is one
million times the value of a one in a million risk.”); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in
Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 196-97 (2000)
(“Economic discussions of the value of life almost invariably focus on the value of a
statistical life, considering an individual facing a very small probability of death. . . . [T]he
value of a statistical life is a prospective measure that in effect establishes the appropriate
price society is willing to pay for small risk reductions.”).
7. See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 18 (2003)
(concluding in a meta-study that most studies determine the VSL to lie in a range between
$3.8 and $9 million); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 94 (“The most detailed meta-study,
[Viscusi & Aldy 2003,] far more comprehensive than the EPA’s own analysis, identifies a
central value in the general vicinity of $8 million and finds that most studies produce VSLs
ranging from $3.8 million to $9 million. . . . (Note that on the basis of their reading of the
technical literature, agencies actually use a narrow range of $6 million to $9 million, with
increasing consensus in the vicinity of $9 million.)”).
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to a statistical life.8 An equally prominent group of scholars has
vigorously defended the use of the VSL to guide mortality risk
CBA,9 often while acknowledging the need for further work to
develop and refine the VSL calculation.10
This article stakes out a novel and more nuanced position
based on a largely neglected aspect of mortality risk regulation:
moral context. Whether and how the VSL is used to guide
8. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 61, 67 (“Putting a price on
human life makes most people uncomfortable. It is clearly unacceptable to virtually all
religions and moral philosophies. Nonetheless, the quantitative valuation of life has become
central to recent analyses of public policies. . . . A more careful restatement of the ethical
objection is that there is no ‘price’ for life because its value is immeasurable.”); DOUGLAS
A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR
OBJECTIVITY 111-13 (2010) (critiquing the method by which CBA monetizes human life as
“driven by the procedure’s purely individualistic conception of value” and “tolerat[ing]
treatment of statistical victims that would be considered well nigh criminal in ordinary
contexts”); John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 95 (1978); David M.
Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The
Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 1, 53 (2005) (“CBA proponents contemplate comparison of costs to benefits. To
facilitate comparison, analysts attempt to place a dollar value on the averted harms, such as
deaths and illnesses. The methodologies for doing this involve numerous highly
questionable value assumptions.”); see also W. Kip Viscusi, How to Value a Life, 32 J. ECON.
& FIN. 311, 322 (2008) (noting “many non-economists continue to attack the entire concept
of monetizing risks to life”).
9. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 178-82 (“Pricing life does not
‘cheapen’ life. There are numerous contexts, other than CBA, in which premature death or
the risk of premature death is priced . . . .”); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 16 (1993) (“[E]very day, each of us
implicitly evaluates risks to life. . . . We find it worth spending money on an ordinary fire
alarm system, but not worth installing state-of-the-art automatic-phone-dialing fire
protection. We believe it worth installing guard rails on bridges, but not worth coating the
Grand Canyon in soft plastic to catch those who might fall over the edge.”); SUNSTEIN, supra
note 5, at 7 (“[F]ar from being preposterous, efforts to value human life (more accurately,
statistical mortality risks) are rooted in exceedingly appealing ideas about welfare and
autonomy—ideas that deserve a prominent place in a free society.”); Viscusi, supra note 8,
at 311 (“[T]he economic approach to valuing life, or more specifically, valuing risks to life,
is quite different and more legitimate than an accounting procedure based on one’s
income.”).
10. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 181 (“A different problem with VSL,
as currently practiced, involves disaggregation. Agencies almost always employ a single
VSL figure, regardless of the number of life-years saved or lost or other individual
characteristics. Perfect welfarist measurement would be more disaggregated.”); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 5, at 95-106 (arguing VSL should be individuated across different types of
mortality risks and differently-situated persons); W. Kip Viscusi, Policy Challenges of the
Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life, 6 FOUND. & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS
99, 117-120 (2010) (discussing variability of VSL based on the magnitude of the mortality
risk and age of those exposed to the risk); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea
for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385, 389 (2004).
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mortality risk regulation should depend on two morally
significant features of the risk imposition in question: (1) the
extent to which those exposed to the risk benefit from the
industrial activity that gives rise to the risk; and (2) the extent to
which those exposed to the risk bear the costs of compliance with
the risk-reducing regulation. These two features vary in
characteristic ways depending on the type of risk imposition at
issue. This article distinguishes broadly between two types of
mortality risk impositions—consumption risks and workplace
risks—and makes a claim about the justifiability of using the VSL
to guide risk regulation in each case.11
As explained in Part I, the VSL used in federal risk
regulation is based on the general economic concept of
willingness-to-pay and, more specifically, on empirical studies of
the amount of money individuals are willing to pay to avoid (or
the amount of money they are willing to accept to assume) very
small mortality risks. The basic calculation goes as follows.
Suppose labor market and consumer studies show that, on the
average, individuals are willing to pay $90 to eliminate a 1 in
100,000 risk of death to which they would otherwise be subject.
This implies that, were the risk imposed on 100,000 individuals,
the collective willingness-to-pay to eliminate the risk, and thereby
avoid one statistical death, would be $9 million ($90 multiplied
by 100,000). On this basis, the value of a statistical life is
determined to be $9 million.12
Armed with this information, CBA can be applied to
mortality risk regulation. If a regulation that would cost $20
11. For a brief discussion of the moral context created by a third type of mortality risk
imposition—environmental risks—see infra text accompanying note 274. In future work, I
plan to explore the justifiability of using the VSL to guide the regulation of such risks. The
present article focuses on consumption and workplace risks.
12. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 51 (“With these values, the government is
not actually ‘valuing life.’ It is valuing the reduction of mortality risks—typically by
eliminating low-level risks, for example, risks of 1 in 100,000. When it is said that a life is
‘worth’ $9 million in such cases, what is really meant is that people are willing to pay, or ask
to be paid, $90, on average, to eliminate a risk of 1 in 100,000.” (footnote omitted)); W. Kip
Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life: Evidence and Policy Implications,
in BENEFIT-COST ANALYSES FOR SECURITY POLICIES: DOES INCREASED SAFETY HAVE TO
REDUCE EFFICIENCY 78, 81 (Carol Mansfield & V. Kerry Smith eds., 2015) (“The VSL
pertains to the trade-off between money and very small risks of death. Suppose that there is
a risk of one chance in 10,000 to 10,000 people, so that this group will experience one
expected death. If each person would be willing to pay $800 to eliminate the risk, the VSL
in this instance would be $8 million, or 10,000 people x $800 per person.”).
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million is expected to save a single statistical life by eliminating
a 1 in 100,000 risk of death to 100,000 people, CBA would reject
the regulation on the grounds that it is not cost-justified, since the
monetized value of the regulation’s life-saving benefit is $9
million, less than half of its cost. CBA would reach this same
conclusion regardless of the moral context of the risk imposition.
By the lights of CBA, the conclusion would follow with equal
force regardless of whether those exposed to the risk benefit from
the activity that gives rise to the risk, and regardless of whether
those exposed to the risk bear the cost of complying with riskreducing regulations.
This one-size-fits-all approach to using the VSL in mortality
risk regulation is a fundamental error. Whether and how the VSL
is deployed should vary with the moral context.
The VSL is most defensible in the context of consumption
risks—risks associated with using or consuming a particular good
or service.13 Such risks typically fall on consumers who not only
benefit meaningfully from the industrial activity giving rise to the
risk, but who also bear all or substantially all of the costs of riskreducing regulations.14 For example, the city residents exposed
to a small risk of death from drinking city water containing trace
amounts of arsenic both benefit from the activity that puts them
at risk (public provision of drinking water) and, by paying higher
water bills reflecting passed through regulatory costs, bear the
costs of complying with EPA regulations limiting the amount of
arsenic in the water.15
As explained in Part II, using the VSL to guide mortality risk
CBA in such circumstances is defensible on the basis of the norm
of personal autonomy (though not, as is commonly asserted, on
the basis of the norm of welfare maximization).16 Where the cost
of complying with a risk-reducing regulation is borne by, and
divided equally among, the same group of people that is exposed
13. See Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi, Value of a Statistical Life: Relative
Position vs. Relative Age, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 142, 142 (2005).
14. See id. at 145.
15. See generally EPA, No. 815-R-00-026, Arsenic in Drinking Water Rule:
Economic Analysis (2000) [hereinafter EPA Analysis].
16. Cass Sunstein has argued that using a VSL as a guide for mortality risk regulation
in such circumstances (which Sunstein calls “[e]asy [c]ases”) is defensible on the basis of
both autonomy and welfare. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 113-15. For reasons explained
in Part II.B, the welfare-based rationale appears to be open to serious objection.
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to the risk, honoring the risk-bearers’ autonomy requires rejecting
any regulation whose total cost exceeds the sum the risk-bearers
would collectively be willing to pay to eliminate the risk.
Enacting such a regulation would amount to forcing each riskbearer to invest more in their own safety than they would
rationally wish to, thereby violating each risk-bearer’s right to be
sovereign in matters affecting their interests alone.
By contrast, the VSL is more problematic in the context of
workplace risks—risks associated with employment in producing
a particular good or service.17 Such risks typically fall on workers
who benefit meaningfully from the industrial activity giving rise
to the risk (because it provides them with a livelihood), but who
bear no appreciable share of the costs of risk-reducing
regulations.18 These costs are typically passed through to
consumers or deducted from shareholder profits.19 For example,
the electroplating workers exposed to a small risk of death from
exposure to hexavalent chromium (a carcinogenic chemical used
in a number of industries) benefit significantly from the existence
of the electroplating industry, but are unlikely to bear a substantial
share of the costs of compliance with OSHA regulations limiting
their exposure to hexavalent chromium.20
This changes the moral context in an important way. As
explained in Part III, using the general concept of willingness-topay to guide risk regulation in such circumstances is morally
defensible on the basis of the norm of equity, rather than personal
autonomy.21 Suppose the workplace chromium regulation
discussed above would eliminate a 1 in 100,000 risk of death to
100,000 workers. Suppose further that its $20 million cost would
be evenly distributed among 1 million consumers in the form of a
$20-per-unit price increase. Standard CBA is insensitive to
whether the $20 million cost of saving one statistical life is
17. Kniesner & Viscusi, supra note 13, at 142.
18. See W. Kip Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental
Regulation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1003, 1022-23 (2006).
19. Dov Waisman, Equity and Feasibility Regulation, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1263, 1266
(2016).
20. See generally Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg.
10100 (Feb. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, & 1926).
21. Cf. Waisman, supra note 19, at 1265-66, 1269-73 (arguing that the norm of equity
provides the basis for feasibility-based regulation, which requires mortality risks to be
reduced to the maximum extent technologically and economically feasible).
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distributed among the same 100,000 people subject to the 1 in
100,000 mortality risk or among 1 million people who are not
subject to that risk. In either case, the regulation’s $9 million
benefit cannot justify its $20 million cost.
From the standpoint of equity, however, the manner in which
costs and risks are distributed is significant. In the case of the
chromium regulation, a safety benefit worth $90 to each worker
could be provided at a cost of just $20 to each cost-bearing
consumer. Equity—a norm which attends to and compares the
burdens and benefits experienced by each affected individual as
the result of the action or policy under consideration—would
weigh strongly in favor of the regulation,22 because it would
arguably be unreasonable for each consumer to reject having to
pay a $20 cost so that each worker can avoid a risk imposition
that is equivalent to a $90 cost. In these circumstances, equity
supports enacting the regulation even though, by the lights of
standard CBA, it is not cost-justified.
This equity-based line of reasoning embodies a modified,
individualized form of CBA, one that attends to the risks and costs
experienced by each affected risk-bearer and cost-bearer, rather
than to risks and costs considered in the aggregate.23 This
individualized form of CBA relies directly on the individual
willingness-to-pay data upon which the VSL is based, rather than
on the collective willingness-to-pay calculation which the VSL
itself reflects.24 When it comes to workplace mortality risks, there
does not seem to be a normative basis for conducting CBA with
reference to the VSL. Instead, standard VSL-based CBA should
be subordinate to the individualized form of CBA described in
this article.

22. See id. at 1267.
23. See Dov Waisman, Reasonable Precaution for the Individual, 88 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 653, 676-79 (2014) (introducing and defending an “individual risk principle” that
determines regulatory levels based on a comparison between each cost-bearer’s share of
regulatory costs and each risk-bearer’s resulting reduction in mortality risk).
24. Id. at 697-98.
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I. FACTUAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A. How the Value of a Statistical Life is Calculated
Suppose a given regulation is expected to save 100 lives at a
cost of $1 billion. Do the life-saving benefits of the regulation
justify its monetary cost? At least since President Reagan’s 1981
Executive Order directing federal regulatory agencies to engage
in cost-benefit analysis of all major regulations,25 regulators have
been faced with the difficult task of answering such questions.
The approach regulatory agencies have taken is to convert
the health benefits of such a regulation—primarily, deaths
avoided—into the same currency as the regulation’s cost—
dollars.26 In the early 1980s, the notion of a “value of statistical
life” was born, and has since been used pervasively by federal
agencies charged with regulating risks of death or serious bodily
harm.27
How exactly do regulatory agencies calculate the VSL? This
question presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the view that a
statistical death should be prevented at any monetary cost strikes
many as implausible.28 On the other hand, using willingness-topay or willingness-to-accept as a method for attaching a monetary
value to life itself is problematic because, except in very unusual
circumstances, no sane person would be willing to forfeit his or
her life in exchange for any amount of money.29 How have
economists resolved this dilemma? “The answer,” explains Cass
Sunstein in a 2005 book, “involves real-world markets, producing
evidence of compensation levels for actual risks.”30 Moreover,
Sunstein previously suggested,
25. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
26. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
537, 538 (2005).
27. See id. at 538 n.9; see also Waisman, supra note 19, at 1299.
28. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 9, at 16 (“[E]very day each of us implicitly evaluates
risks to life. We begin to run risks to achieve our daily objectives the instant we get out of
bed. . . . We believe it worth installing guard rails on bridges, but not worth coating the Grand
Canyon in soft plastic to catch those who might fall over the edge.”).
29. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 68-69; Broome, supra note
8, at 92, 95; David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to
Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 340 (2011).
30. CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
132 (2005); see also Viscusi, supra note 10, at 104 (“Suppose that there is a risk of one

2018

MORAL CONTEXT

225

In the workplace and for consumer goods, additional safety
has a ‘price’; market evidence, involving the compensation
people actually receive, is investigated to identify that price.
Agency valuations are largely a product of studies of
workplace risks, attempting to determine how much workers
are paid to assume mortality hazards. The relevant risks
usually are in the general range of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000.
The calculation of the value of a statistical life (VSL) is a
product of simple arithmetic. Suppose . . . that workers must
be paid $[9]00, on average, to eliminate a risk of 1/10,000.
If so, the value of a statistical life would be said to be $[9]
million.31

It is important to bear in mind that this method of attaching
a monetary value to human life is, in one very clear sense, based
on a fiction.32 There is a huge inferential leap from the empirical
proposition that an average worker would require a payment of
$900 to be exposed to 1 in 10,000 risk of death to the proposition
that a statistical worker’s life has a value of $9 million.33
Sunstein, in fact, explicitly rejects the latter proposition:
With these values, the government is not actually ‘valuing
life.’ It is valuing the reduction of mortality risks—typically
by eliminating low-level risks, for example, risks of 1 in
100,000. When it is said that a life is ‘worth’ $9 million in
such cases, what is really meant is that people are willing to
pay, or ask to be paid, $90, on average, to eliminate a risk of
1 in 100,000.34

chance in 10,000 to 10,000 people so that this group will experience one expected death. If
each person would be willing to pay $800 to eliminate the risk, the VSL in this instance
would be $8 million, or 10,000 people x $800 per person. This is the amount that could be
raised to prevent one expected death.”).
31. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 551 (footnotes omitted) (in the last two
sentences of the quote, the original text uses figures of $600 and $6 million). Professor W.
Kip Viscusi is generally credited with introducing the practice of calculating VSL based on
willingness-to-pay figures derived from actual labor market behavior. See, e.g., W. Kip
Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 845-46 (2000).
32. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 26, at 544.
33. See Viscusi, supra note 10, at 104.
34. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 51 (footnote omitted). Sunstein further notes, “it would
be grossly misleading to offer the following suggestion: The value of a statistical life is $9
million. It would be much more accurate to say that for risks of 1/10,000, the median WTP
in the relevant population is $900—or that for risks of 1/100,000, the median WTP is $90.”
Id. at 95.
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Obviously, it cannot be inferred that an average worker
would forfeit their life in exchange for a monetary payment of any
amount of money, much less a payment of $9 million.35 To
generalize this point, it cannot be inferred that the amount a
worker would be willing to pay to eliminate a risk of death would
increase in a linear fashion as the risk itself increases. Rather, a
person’s willingness-to-pay to avoid a risk of death increases in a
nonlinear manner as the magnitude of the risk increases.36 For
example, although a worker might be willing to pay only $900 for
the elimination of a 1 in 10,000 risk of death, she might well be
willing to pay more than ten times as much to eliminate a risk ten
times as great.37 Judge Richard Posner has put this point as
follows: “[C]ost-benefit analysis values risks, and the so-called
value of life that cost-benefit analysts refer to is just a
mathematical transformation.”38

B. Normative Pluralism
The theoretical basis of this article’s argument is a moral
theory known as normative pluralism. Normative pluralists hold
that moral judgments must be understood to rest on multiple
norms and deny that any one norm—e.g., maximizing overall
well-being—can adequately explain the moral rightness or
wrongness of all actions.39 Normative pluralism allows a number
35. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 5, at 68-69; JOHN BROOME,
ETHICS OUT OF ECONOMICS 180-81 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004); Driesen, supra note 29,
at 340.
36. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 95 (“It is plausible to think that people’s WTP to
reduce statistical risks is nonlinear. As the probability approaches 100 percent, people
become willing to pay an amount for risk reduction that rises nonlinearly to 100 percent of
their wealth; as the risk approaches zero, WTP nonlinearly approaches nothing.”); Richard
A. Posner, CBA: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, in COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 324-25
(Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, eds.) (2001) (noting “people are much more reluctant
(plausibly more than a thousand times as reluctant) to be subjected to” a 1 in 1,000 mortality
risk than to a 1 in 1 million mortality risk). Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, The Devaluation of Life, 3
REG. & GOVERNANCE 103, 106 (2009) (observing that “as the magnitude of the risk change
increases, willingness-to-pay amounts increase less than proportionally and willingness-toaccept amounts increase more than proportionally”); Viscusi, supra note 10, at 140, fig. 12.1
(showing nonlinear function for relation of worker wages to workplace fatality risks).
37. See Posner, supra note 36, at 324-25.
38. Id. at 324.
39. See William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 473, 477 (2010).
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of
normative
factors—including
overall
well-being,
deontological constraints and options, equity, fairness, personal
autonomy, rights, and possibly others—to ground moral
determinations.40 It further allows multiple factors to jointly
determine the moral rightness or wrongness of a single action, as
different factors interact with one another in determining whether
the action is right or wrong, all things considered.41
Though a general defense of normative pluralism lies
beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that normative
pluralism is a popular position among both contemporary moral
philosophers42 and philosophically-inclined legal theorists
interested in CBA and risk regulation.43 This article argues in
Parts II and III that, when it comes to determining whether it is
morally justifiable to conduct mortality risk CBA with reference
to a VSL, different normative factors are relevant and decisive in

40. Normative pluralism is often thought to go hand-in-hand with intuitionism. See,
e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 34 (1971) (“Intuitionist theories, then, have two
features: first, they consist of a plurality of first principles which may conflict to give
contrary directives in particular types of cases; and second, they include no explicit method,
no priority rules, for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a
balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right.”).
41. See SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 177 (1998).
42. See, e.g., id. at 72, 80-81 (noting possibility of coherent normative pluralism as to
wrong-making properties when discussing deontological constraints and moderate
(“threshold”) deontology); Johann Frick, Contractualism and Social Risk, 43 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 175, 219, 221-22 (2015) (proposing a “pluralist account of moral rightness” that
embraces considerations of both equity and well-being); see also 3 TERENCE IRWIN, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY 690, 906 (2009) (noting
that both W.D. Ross and the 18th century moral philosopher Richard Price accept a “pluralist
view” that posits a “pluralism about ultimate moral principles,” “none of which is always
prior to the others”); Value Pluralism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2018),
http://plato.stanford.edu /entries/value-pluralism/ [https://perma.cc/MK52-AX5R] (noting
that, in addition to the prominent early 20th-century moral philosopher W.D. Ross, numerous
contemporary moral philosophers are committed to foundational normative pluralism,
including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor, and Michael Stocker).
43. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 53, (“Our position is not
utilitarianism, but ‘weak welfarism.’ ‘Weak welfarism’ claims that overall welfare is morally
relevant, not that it is morally decisive. Morality may encompass a plurality of moral factors.
It certainly includes overall welfare; but it may also include such factors as moral rights, the
fair distribution of welfare, and even moral considerations wholly detached from welfare,
such as intrinsic environmental values.” (footnote omitted); SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 7,
92-93, 113-15, 129-30 (discussing relevance of two norms—welfare and autonomy—to
analysis of normative basis of mortality risk regulation); see also Matthew D. Adler & Eric
A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1106-08 (2000).
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different moral contexts. The most salient norms are overall wellbeing, personal autonomy, and equity.44
Because normative pluralism holds that normative
judgments should be informed by a number of independent
norms, none of which can be fully expressed in terms of the
others, it makes room for the possibility that a certain norm or
group of norms should prevail in some situations, while a
different norm or group of norms should prevail in others.45 For
example, a normative pluralist might hold that considerations of
fairness or equity should prevail over considerations of overall
well-being when an act or policy will deliver tiny benefits to a
vast number of people, but inflict devastating losses on a very
small number of people. Such a policy could be rejected on
equitable grounds notwithstanding that it might increase
aggregate well-being significantly on net. On the other hand, a
pluralist might hold that considerations of overall well-being
should prevail over equitable considerations when, for example,
choosing between a policy that poses a 1 in 1,000 risk of death to
1 million people (1,000 expected deaths) and a policy that poses
a 1 in 10 risk of death to 100 people (10 expected deaths). The
latter policy could be justified on grounds of overall well-being
notwithstanding that it imposes a far greater ex ante burden on
each of the 100 persons it would affect than the alternative policy
would impose on each of the 1 million persons it would affect.
When normative considerations conflict, a normative
pluralist would reach a considered judgment about the morally
correct course of action by gauging the strength of those
competing considerations.46
If, for example, equitable
considerations weigh strongly in favor of a particular course of
action, and considerations of overall well-being weigh only
weakly against it, the normative pluralist could sensibly hold the
course of action to be morally permissible.47 The more difficult
cases are those in which the conflicting normative considerations
are of relatively equal strength.

44. See infra Parts II & III.
45. See Twining, supra note 39, at 480-81; see also Dietmar von der Pfordten, Five
Elements of Normative Ethics – A General Theory of Normative Individualism, 15 ETHICAL
THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 449, 449-50 (2012).
46. See KAGAN, supra note 41, at 183.
47. Waisman, supra note 19, at 1296-97.
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As a normative pluralist, it is tempting to look for a decision
rule or algorithm with which to resolve such cases. That
temptation should be resisted, in my view. The task of moral
theory is to identify the relevant normative factors that should
inform our moral judgments and to explain why those factors
matter,48 not to provide a quasi-mathematical rule for making all
moral judgments. Moral judgment in particular cases is
inherently multifactorial, and, therefore, deeply fact-dependent,
making a rigid algorithm an inappropriate substitute for
considered reflection and deliberation when the normative factors
one has identified stand in equipoise.49
II. CONSUMPTION RISKS AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY
Commonly, an industrial activity poses a risk of death to a
group of persons that both benefits meaningfully from the activity
and shoulders all or substantially all of the costs of complying
with regulations that reduce the risk.50 Consumption risks are the
best example of this type of risk imposition.51 Many industries
produce goods that pose a small but nontrivial risk of death to the
consumers who purchase and use them. Automobiles, heavy
machinery, pharmaceuticals, publically-provided drinking water,
and pesticide-treated food are some of the most obvious
examples. All or substantially all of the costs of complying with
government regulations designed to reduce such risks are

48. See KAGAN, supra note 41, at 17-22, 189-203 (distinguishing between “factorial”
views that identify which normative factors or properties make acts wrong and
“foundational” views that explain why the identified normative factors are wrong-making).
49. See Frick, supra note 42, at 223 (“The aim and ambition of moral philosophy
should be to inform our judgment, by making us alive to the relevant ethical considerations,
not to abolish the need for judgment altogether”).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
51. However, workplace risks could conceivably exhibit the same structure if all or
substantially all of the costs of regulatory compliance were met by reducing wages or laying
off workers. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 117 (noting that, with respect to workers’
compensation regulation, “nonunionized workers faced a dollar-for-dollar wage reduction,
corresponding almost perfectly to the expected value of the benefits that they received.”).
By the same token, some consumption risks might not exhibit this structure. For example,
if the costs of complying with regulations reducing the risk of using or consuming a product
were deducted from shareholder profits rather than passed on to consumer, the risk would
exhibit the structure of the typical workplace risk.
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typically passed on to consumers in the form of price increases.52
When this occurs, the group of people exposed to the risk in
question is roughly the same group responsible for paying the
costs of reducing that risk.53 Moreover, these risk-bearing, costbearing consumers typically benefit meaningfully from the
industrial activity that gives rise to the risk, as they willingly pay
to consume its product or service.54 These features of the typical
consumption risk create a particular moral context, one that is
relevant to the justifiability of using a VSL to guide mortality risk
regulation. In this Part, I argue that, when it comes to
consumption risks exhibiting this structure, using a VSL to guide
mortality risk CBA is morally defensible on the basis of the norm
of personal autonomy.55 It is not, however, defensible on the
basis of welfare maximization, the norm on which mortality risk
CBA is often defended.56

A. Example: Arsenic in Drinking Water
In 1996, Congress directed EPA to newly regulate the
presence of arsenic in publically provided drinking water.57
Arsenic is a naturally occurring carcinogen.58 When consumed
in drinking water, arsenic has been found to cause cancer in a
number of organs, including the lungs, bladder, kidneys, and
liver.59 A 1999 report from the National Research Council
concluded that, at the then-prevailing maximum contaminant
52. See id. at 113, 117 (noting that “Easy Cases,” in which “the cost of eliminating
any risk is borne entirely by those who benefit from eliminating that risk . . . .”).
53.
HOWARD BEALES ET AL., REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT,
GOVERNMENT REGULATION: THE GOOD, THE BAD, & THE UGLY 4 (2017), http://
regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Regulatory-Process-Working-Group-Paper.
pdf
[https://perma.cc/535W-WNFE].
54. Arno J. Rethans, Towards Determinants of Acceptable Risk: The Case of Product
Risks, 8 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 506, 506-07 (1981), http://www.acrweb
site.org/volumes/5846/volumes/v08/NA-08 [https://perma.cc/242F-4478].
55. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 113-15 (arguing that using a VSL to guide CBA
in this type of case is justifiable on the basis of autonomy).
56. But see id. at 114-15 (arguing that, in addition to autonomy, welfare provides an
independent normative basis for using a VSL to guide CBA in this context); ADLER &
POSNER, supra note 3, at 178-82 (arguing that “the VSL method . . . allows CBA to
determine with reasonable accuracy whether lifesaving projects really do increase overall
welfare, given their additional welfare effects (for example, compliance costs)”).
57. See EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 1.1, § 2.3, at 2-6 to 2-7.
58. Id. § 2.2.1.
59. Id. §§ 1.2, 2.2.1.
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level of 50 µg/L (micrograms per liter) of drinking water, arsenic
could pose an aggregate cancer risk “on the order of 1 in 100.”60
The Safe Drinking Water Act directs the EPA to undertake
CBA when setting regulatory levels.61 Specifically, the Act
provided that,
After determining an MCL [maximum contaminant level]
based on affordable technology for large systems, EPA must
complete an economic analysis to determine whether the
benefits of the standard justify the costs. If not, EPA may
adjust the MCL to a level that ‘maximizes health risk
reduction benefits at a cost that is justified by the benefits.’62

In its Economic Analysis, EPA noted that section
1412(b)(6)(A) of the Act allowed it to set the MCL for arsenic at
a less stringent level than would be economically feasible so long
as that level “maximizes health risk reduction at a level where
costs and benefits are also considered.”63
After conducting a thorough cost-benefit analysis, EPA set
the new MCL for arsenic at 10 µg/L.64 The annual monetized
health benefit of reducing the arsenic MCL from 50 µg/L to 10
µg/L was found to be in the range of $139.6 million to $197.7
million (median of $168.65 million).65 These benefits included
the avoidance of both fatal and non-fatal lung and bladder
cancer.66 Reducing the arsenic MCL to 10 µg/L would result in
the avoidance of 21.3 to 29.8 premature cancer deaths annually (a
median of 25.55 deaths avoided annually).67 In monetizing the
benefit of avoiding premature deaths caused by lung or bladder
cancer, the EPA used a VSL of $6.1 million.68 To monetize the
60. Id. § 1.2.
61. Id. § 2.3, at 2-6.
62. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 1412(b)(6); see also
EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 3.1.3.
63. EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 1.3.
64. Id. The EPA determined that the mean cancer risk posed by arsenic at 10 µg/L
was between .63 in 10,000 and 2.99 in 10,000. Id. § 5.3.2, at 5-14 exhibit 5-4(c).
65. Id. § 5.4, at 5-26 exhibit 5-11.
66. EPA’s quantitative benefit analysis was confined to the avoidance of lung and
bladder cancer because these were the only types of cancer as to which EPA had sufficient
data to perform a quantitative analysis. See id. § 5.3.1. EPA determined that lung cancer
carries a twenty-year mortality rate of 88%, whereas the twenty-year mortality rate for
bladder cancer is just 26%. See id. § B.1.7, at B-12.
67. Id. § 5.4.1, at 5-22 exhibit 5-9(c).
68. See EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 5.4.2, at 5-23.
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benefit of avoiding non-fatal lung or bladder cancer, the EPA
used a figure of $607,162.69
The total annual cost of reducing the MCL from 50 µg/L to
10 µg/L was found to be $205.6 million, exceeding the median
monetized health benefits by $7.9 million to $66 million.70
Although the costs of reducing the level to 10 µg/L were,
therefore, found to marginally exceed the monetized benefits,
EPA’s decision to nevertheless set the level at 10 µg/L was
informed by its conclusion that doing so carried substantial nonquantifiable benefits.71
The EPA further noted that the costs of complying with the
new arsenic regulation were likely to be passed on to consumers
in the form of price increases.72 The EPA determined that
reducing the arsenic MCL to 10 µg/L would increase the average
household’s annual water bill by $31.85.73
Thus, as Cass Sunstein has observed, the EPA’s regulation
of arsenic in drinking water exhibits the structure of the typical
consumption risk.74 The risky activity at issue—the public
provision of drinking water—obviously provides a significant
benefit to each risk-bearing water consumer. Moreover, as the
EPA noted, the costs of complying with arsenic regulations would
be passed on to water consumers in the form of rate increases.75
Thus, the people exposed to cancer risks from arsenic both benefit
significantly from the industrial activity that gives rise to those
risks, and bear all or substantially all of the costs of compliance
69. See id. at 5-24
70. Id. § 5.4.3, at 5-26 exhibit 5-11. The $205.6 million total annual cost figure is
based on a discount rate of 7%. Id. § 7.3.1, at 7-2 exhibit 7-1. If a lower discount rate of 3%
is used, the total annual cost is $180.4 million. Id. § 1.4.
71. See id. § 5.5.3 (“Were EPA able to quantify some of the currently non-quantifiable
health effects and other benefits associated with arsenic regulation, monetized benefits
estimates could be significantly higher than what are shown . . . .”); see also id. § 1.4, at 17, § 5.4.3, at 5-26 exhibit 5-11.
72. See id. § 6.3.3, at 6-34 (“Household level costs are considered a good proxy for
the affordability of rule compliance with regard to CWSs [community water systems], since
water systems recover costs at the household level through increased water rates.”); see also
SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 117 (“For drinking water regulation, . . . [t]he entire cost of
regulation is passed onto consumers in the form of higher water bills.”).
73. EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 6.6.3, at 6-35 exhibit 6-17.
74. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 113, 117 (observing that regulation of arsenic in
drinking water is one in which “the cost of eliminating any risk is borne entirely by those
who benefit from eliminating that risk”).
75. Id. at 113.
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with regulations that reduce those risks. This makes the cancer
risk posed by arsenic in drinking water a good real-world example
of a consumption risk.

B. Welfare Maximization Fails to Justify Use of a VSL
Suppose the mortality risk from arsenic in drinking water is
1 in 100,000 and that this risk falls on 100,000 people. Suppose
the risk can be eliminated by a regulation that will cost the
industry $20 million, and suppose this cost will be entirely passed
on to and equally distributed among the 100,000 people subject
to the risk, for a per capita cost of $200 (call this example Arsenic
(100,000)). If the government decides not to regulate under these
circumstances, can its decision be defended on the basis of
maximizing overall well-being?
Although a number of
commentators have argued or suggested that it can,76 a close
analysis suggests otherwise.
Suppose that the most that any of the 100,000 people subject
to the arsenic risk would be willing to pay to avoid a 1 in 100,000
mortality risk is $90. Most people will agree that this fact shows
that each person would prefer bearing the 1 in 100,000 risk to
bearing the $200 cost, which in turn arguably shows that
imposing the risk rather than the cost would leave each person
better off. One might posit that these facts have a clear
implication for overall well-being, namely, that imposing the $20
million cost on the group of 100,000 risk-bearers would leave the
group worse off than would imposing a 1 in 100,000 risk on the
group. One might then infer, on this basis, that enacting the
regulation—and thereby imposing the cost rather than the risk—
would be normatively indefensible. Here is the argument laid out
in steps:
Individual Willingness-to-Pay: The most that any of these
100,000 people would be willing to pay to eliminate the 1 in
100,000 risk of death facing them is $90.
Individual Preference: Therefore, each person would
prefer bearing a 1 in 100,000 risk to bearing a $200 cost.

76. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 178-82; SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at
92, 113-15, 127-30; cf. Adler & Posner, supra note 43, at 1110-11.
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Individual Well-being: Therefore, imposing a 1 in 100,000
risk, rather than a $200 cost on each, person would leave each
person better off.77
Overall Well-being: Therefore, imposing the risk rather
than the cost would leave the entire group of 100,000 affected
persons better off. Thus, overall well-being—the aggregate wellbeing of all affected persons—would be greater in a world in
which the risk is imposed than it would be in a world in which the
cost is imposed.
Normative Conclusion: Therefore, it is normatively
indefensible to impose the cost.
There might be reason to question the move from step 2 to
step 3. People’s preferences might be irrational or ill-informed,
such that the course of action they prefer is not the course of
action that maximizes their welfare.78 There also might be reason
to question the move from step 4 to step 5. Another norm—such
as equity or autonomy—might make it normatively defensible to
impose the cost rather than the risk notwithstanding that overall
well-being would be greater if the risk were imposed rather than
the cost.79
But the move I want to focus on is the move from step 3 to
step 4. From an ex ante point of view, each person is better off
bearing the risk than bearing the cost. For each person, bearing
the risk is equivalent to bearing a $90 cost, whereas eliminating
the risk requires each person to bear a $200 cost. If the risk is
imposed, society bears a total cost of $9 million, whereas if the
cost is imposed and the risk eliminated, society bears a total cost
of $20 million. Thus, from an ex ante point of view, overall wellbeing is greater if the risk, rather than the cost, is imposed.
However, even if all of that is true, it does not seem to follow
that, all things considered, overall well-being is greater if the risk
is imposed instead of the cost. That is because the analysis thus
77. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 92 (“Suppose that people are willing to pay $60,
but no more, to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000. If so, then it might be assumed that their
welfare is increased by asking them to pay that amount—and that their welfare is decreased
by asking them to pay more.”).
78. See, e.g., id. at 118-22 (discussing phenomena of “miswanting” and informational
and behavioral market failures); Adler & Posner, supra note 43, at 1116-22 (discussing
phenomena of uninformed preferences, adaptive preferences, and objectively bad
preferences).
79. See supra Part I.B (discussing normative pluralism).
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far has focused only on ex ante effects on welfare, but has ignored
ex post effects.
When a 1 in 100,000 risk of death is imposed on 100,000
people, two welfare-related losses would be expected to occur,
one ex ante and one ex post.80 Ex ante, each of the 100,000 people
exposed to the risk experiences a welfare-related loss81 just by
virtue of the imposition of the risk. By hypothesis, this loss is
equivalent to the loss associated with paying a $90 monetary cost,
as each person would be willing to pay that much to avoid the risk
at issue. But in addition, one unlucky person is expected to die if
the risk is imposed. The welfare loss associated with this ex post
effect of the risk imposition—one expected death—seems to get
ignored in the move from step 3 to step 4 in the five-step argument
laid about above. The argument sensibly deploys willingness-topay to capture the welfare effect of the risk’s imposition on
100,000 people, but fails to take account of the welfare effect of
the risk’s expected materialization in the death of a single person.
I am certainly not the first to lodge this critique of the welfare
maximization justification for the VSL. Matthew Adler has
observed that the critique originated with a 1978 article by the
philosopher John Broome.82 Adler describes Broome’s critique
as follows:
Imagine the government must choose between two
outcomes: the status quo, and an outcome in which (1)
exactly one person will die; (2) one million persons are at
risk of suffering this death; and (3) other benefits, valued at
$B, are realized. . . . Each person Pi, out of the million
persons at risk of dying, would be willing to accept some
amount Vi as compensation for his one-in-one-million risk.

80. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 92.
81. Id.; Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1565 (2002) (“In
acknowledging the monetary value of reducing risk, economic analysts have contributed to
our growing awareness that life-threatening risk itself—and not just the end result of such
risk, death—is an injury.”); see also Posner, supra note 36, at 324-25 (noting the “ex ante”
costs” of projects that impose risks of death and suggesting that ex ante costs can differ even
when ex post costs are identical). It may be more appropriate, technically, to think of the
imposition of a small risk of death as involving a setback to a welfare-related interest of the
risk-bearer rather than an actual welfare loss to the risk-bearer. (I thank Johann Frick for
impressing this distinction on me during a conversation in early 2014.) For the sake of
simplicity, I will continue to refer to this as a “welfare loss.”
82. See generally Broome, supra note 8.
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These (small) monetary amounts can be aggregated to
produce an overall cost figure $C = ∑Vi. . . . On an ex post
view there seem to be two kinds of harm here, not one. First,
each of the million suffers a risk of death; and that harm,
cumulatively, is captured by ∑Vi. Second, and quite
separately, the person who will die is very seriously harmed:
his life is shortened, and (in the typical case) the balance of
welfare goods realized over the course of his life will be
much lower. But this second harm is, apparently, ignored
when the total cost of the policy is set equal to ∑Vi. If ∑Vi
is, in some way, a measure of this second harm, then
shouldn’t the total cost of the policy be set equal to 2*∑Vi?83

Now, it is of course true that, due to the stochastic nature of
risk, it is expected, but not certain, that one person will die. There
is a significant chance that the imposition of a 1 in 100,000
mortality risk on 100,000 people will not result in a death.84
However, it is more likely than not that at least one person will
die, and there is a significant possibility that more than one person
will die.85 In light of these probabilities, any determination of the
likely effect of the risk imposition on overall well-being needs to
take account of, among other things, the effect that an actual death
would have on overall well-being.

83. Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Time: A Comment on Judge Williams’
Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 282-83 (2001) (emphasis added);
see also Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189,
203-206 (2000) (“One way in which analysts treat the valuation of risk as equivalent to a
valuation of life is that they do not calculate the value of both statistical life and life itself.
They calculate only the value of statistical life . . . . The value of a discrete risk, however,
remains the same regardless of whether anyone actually ends up dying as a result of that risk.
Risk and death are two separate injuries.” (footnote omitted)); see also Ackerman &
Heinzerling, supra note 81, at 1564-65 (“In practice, however, analysts often ignore the
distinction between valuing risk and valuing life. Many regulations reduce risk for a large
number of people and avoid actual death for a much smaller number. A complete costbenefit analysis should, therefore, include valuation of both of these benefits. However, the
standard practice is to calculate a value only for ‘statistical’ life and to ignore life itself.”
(footnote omitted)).
84. As to each risk-bearer, there is a 99.999% (.99999/1) chance that the imposition
will not result in death. Thus, the chance that the risk imposition will not result in any riskbearer’s death is therefore .99999100,000 or roughly 36.8%.
85. Imposing a 1 in 100,000 risk of death on 100,000 people creates roughly a 63.2%
chance of at least one death (1 - .99999100,000). The chance that exactly one death will occur
is roughly 36.8% (.99999 99,999 x (.00001) x (100,000)), while the chance that two or more
deaths will occur is roughly 26.4%.
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When the welfare setback associated with the one expected
death is added to the welfare setback associated with the
imposition of a 1 in 100,000 risk of death on 100,000 people, it is
not at all clear that, all things considered, imposing the risk would
leave everyone better off than imposing the $20 million cost
would. But this is precisely what is claimed in step 4 of the above
argument. In the unlikely (but possible) event that the risk
imposition did not result in anyone’s death, then it is plausible
that imposing the risk rather than the cost turned out to be the
welfare-maximizing course of action.86
This follows
straightforwardly from step 3 of the argument: if each person is
better off being exposed to the risk than paying the cost, then
imposing the risk maximizes overall well-being assuming the
only welfare-related loss that occurs is that associated with the
mere imposition of the risk.87 However, in the considerably more
likely event that the risk imposition materializes in at least one
death, the truth of the claim made in step 3 of the argument does
not entail the truth of the claim made in step 4.
Against this conclusion, Matthew Adler and Eric Posner
have argued that the welfare loss associated with death itself does
get captured in the move from step 3 to step 4. Claiming that “the
overall-welfare loss in premature death is not infinite, but the
finite difference between a longer and shorter life history,” they
argue that the VSL represents a plausible monetization of this
finite welfare loss based on a person’s willingness-to-pay to avoid
very small mortality risks.88 Adler and Posner concede that using
willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept as a measure of wellbeing breaks down when it comes to avoiding certain death, since
a rational person would be willing to pay all of their wealth to
avoid premature death and would be willing to accept only an
infinite amount of money to succumb to premature death,
86. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 179.
87. See id. at 180.
88. See id. at 179-180; see also John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population,
in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 117,
122 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, eds., 2001) (“When a person’s life is saved, she
lives a longer life than she would have lived. The benefit to her is the difference between
the goodness, or value, of her longer life and the goodness, or value, of the shorter life she
would have lived. Conversely, if an event kills a person, the harm done her is the difference
between the value of the longer life she would have lived and the value of the shorter life she
actually lives.”).
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notwithstanding that the welfare loss associated with premature
death is finite.89 In their view, “[t]he VSL method avoids this
problem, by translating” the welfare loss associated with
premature death “into dollars at an ordinary, ‘premortem’ rate
rather than the postmortem rate.”90 This “premortem” conversion
rate between welfare and dollars is the rate that would determine
a person’s willingness-to-pay for “marginal nonlongevity
changes to his welfare . . . (such as small changes in consumption,
in pleasurable or painful experiences, or the provision of some
public good) . . . .”91
Although the premortem conversion rate is supposed to
apply to “marginal nonlongevity” welfare changes—that is,
welfare changes not related to premature death—Adler and
Posner nevertheless attempt to derive this rate from a person’s
willingness-to-pay to avoid a small risk of premature death.92
Adler and Posner reason that if a person is willing to pay $90 to
avoid a 1 in 100,000 risk of premature death, this implies that:
k x ∆U x 1/r = $90
where k is the premortem conversion rate between welfare and
dollars, ∆U is the welfare loss associated with premature death,
and 1/r is the probability of premature death occurring (here,
1/100,000).93 Multiplying both sides of this equation by r, Adler
and Posner obtain the following result:
k x ∆U = $9 million.94
According to Adler and Posner, k x ∆U represents “the utility
difference between the shorter life . . . and the longer life . . .
converted into dollars at rate k.”95 If this is correct, the $9 million
VSL does represent an accurate monetization of the welfare loss
associated with premature death. In that case, a regulation that
would cost $20 million but prevent only one premature death

89. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 180 (“Absent a bequest function, the dying
individual asked about WTP/WTA at the moment before death would pay his entire wealth
(above a subsistence level) to avoid death, and would have an infinite WTA . . . .”).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 180.
95. See id.
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would decrease overall well-being and could therefore be rejected
on welfare maximization grounds.96
There are two problems with this argument, however. First,
because willingness-to-pay to avoid mortality risks increases in a
nonlinear fashion as the magnitude of the mortality risk
increases,97 Adler and Posner’s approach leads to the arbitrary
result that the value of k x ∆U varies with the magnitude of the
mortality risk (1/r) upon which the willingness-to-pay calculation
is based. For example, a person who would be willing to pay $90
to avoid a mortality risk of 1 in 100,000 might well be willing to
pay significantly more than 100 times as much money ($9,000) to
avoid a mortality risk 100 times as great (1 in 1,000). If someone
were willing to pay $20,000 to avoid a mortality risk of 1 in 1,000,
this would yield a value of $20 million for k x ∆U.98 Why should
the $9 million figure generated by Adler and Posner’s analysis
when r is set at 100,000 be preferred to the $20 million figure that
is generated when r is set at 1,000? Both risks are low enough to
deliver only the sort of “small” or “marginal” changes to welfare
Adler and Posner are concerned with, yet they would likely yield
significantly different results for the VSL.99

96. See id. (“So the VSL method is not just an arbitrary device to avoid infinite dollar
valuations. Because it translates the utility loss that occurs with an individual’s premature
death into dollars by using a utility-to-dollar conversion factor proximate to the conversion
factor implicit in WTP/WTA for welfare impacts other than premature death, this technique
allows CBA to determine with reasonable accuracy whether lifesaving projects really do
increase overall welfare, given their additional welfare effects (for example, compliance
costs).” (emphasis added)).
97. See sources cited supra note 35-38.
98. The converse nonlinear phenomenon occurs as the magnitude of the risk decreases
to a level close to zero. For example, although a person might be willing to pay $90 to avoid
a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk, she might well be willing to pay less than a tenth as much ($9)
to avoid a risk a tenth as great (1 in 1 million).
99. In earlier work, Adler himself seemed to recognize the force of this objection. See
Adler, supra note 83, at 284 (“Where one person out of a very large population is certain to
die, each person’s Vi might equal zero, and then ∑Vi will equal zero—which can hardly be
an accurate measure of the welfare loss that will befall the one person who ends up dying.
In general, if we imagine one person out of a population dying, with the size of the population
varying, the ∑Vi will presumably vary as well—and yet the (ex post) harm from the death
remains the same. Why take this invariant harm to be accurately measured by the variable
∑Vi.?”); see also Broome, supra note 8, at 93 (“There may be a very small degree of
probability which people do not distinguish from no chance at all, so they will accept the
chance of being killed without requiring compensation. Suppose the probability is one in
ten million. Then a country with a population of fifty million could kill five people at
random, assessing their deaths at no cost at all.”).
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There would seem to be two ways to explain the finding that
the value of k x ∆U increases as the value of 1/r increases. One
could either posit that the value of k increases when a higher
magnitude mortality risk is involved or posit that the value of ∆U
increases when a higher magnitude mortality risk is involved.
The latter possibility is plainly absurd. The welfare loss
associated with premature death cannot plausibly be thought to
vary depending on the magnitude of the risk of premature death
occurring.100 The former possibility, however, contradicts Adler
and Posner’s assertion that k “is precisely the rate that would
determine [a person’s] WTP/WTA for marginal nonlongevity
changes to his welfare . . . .”101 Adler and Posner say nothing to
suggest the possibility that k can vary. They certainly make it
sound as though k is a constant, fixed conversion rate for all
“marginal nonlongevity changes to welfare.” However, Adler
and Posner’s approach suggests the value of k would change
significantly depending on the magnitude of the mortality risk at
issue. As the magnitude of the risk increases, k increases
significantly.102 The question then becomes: why should the k
value derived from a person’s willingness to pay to avoid a 1 in
100 or 1 in 1,000 mortality risk be any less valid than the k value
derived from a person’s willingness to pay to avoid a 1 in 100,000
or 1 in 1 million mortality risk? At the end of the day, there does
not seem to be any non-arbitrary way to set the value of k, nor do
Adler and Posner suggest one. But if that is true, then the
monetization of the welfare loss associated with premature death
itself (k x ∆U) is arbitrary as well.
The other problem with Adler and Posner’s analysis is that,
even if it is correct as far as it goes, it ignores the ex ante welfare
setback associated with imposition of a risk of premature death.
According to Adler and Posner, the VSL represents a reasonably
accurate monetization of the welfare loss associated with
premature death. However, as Adler himself noted when
summarizing Broome’s critique in the passage quoted above,

100. See Adler, supra note 83, at 284.
101. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 3, at 180.
102. For example, assuming a person were willing to pay $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000
mortality risk, but $20,000 to avoid a 1 in 1,000 mortality risk, the value of k derived from
an analysis based on a 1 in 1,000 mortality risk would be more than double the value derived
from an analysis based on a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk.
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when a premature death is expected to result from the imposition
of a small mortality risk on a large number of people, two welfarerelated losses are involved. In addition to the welfare loss
associated with the premature death itself, there is also the welfare
loss associated with the mere imposition of the mortality risk on
the risk-bearers.103 If Adler and Posner are correct that the VSL
represents a monetization of the ex post welfare loss associated
with an actual premature death, then how does the ex ante welfare
loss associated with the risk imposition get accounted for and
monetized so that it can be incorporated into CBA?
The standard response to this objection is that the mere
imposition of a risk of death need does not involve an actual
welfare loss (unless the risk-bearer is aware of the risk and
experiences fear or apprehension as a result) and therefore need
not be incorporated into CBA.104 There are, however, two
problems with this response. To begin with, it does not square
well with statements by Viscusi, Sunstein, and the EPA to the
effect that the VSL represents the tradeoff between money and
small risks of death, not the tradeoff between money and death
itself.105 Such statements suggest—more or less explicitly—that

103. Adler and Posner seem to implicitly acknowledge this point when they posit that
“small changes to [a person’s] utility . . . are converted to dollars at rate k” and then use k in
the equation k x ∆U x 1/r to represent a person’s “WTP to avoid the 1-in-r risk.” Id.; see
also sources cited supra notes 77, 81, & 83.
104. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 83, at 286 (“[R]isk, per se, is not a harm. Fear and
other affective states associated with risk can surely constitute welfare setbacks—and should
be separately measured by the cost-benefit analyst—but the mere fact that a person is at risk
of death does not diminish his well-being. Most plausibly, this is true where the person is
unaware of the risk; it also may be true where he is aware of the risk, but does not fear it.”);
Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW 321, 336 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“[I]f the processes that caused or might in
the future cause physical harm are deterministic, then there is no basis for saying that a person
who has been put at risk by another of suffering such harm has, just by reason of being put
at risk, sustained damage distinct in kind from the physical harm.”).
105. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 10, at 101 (“The value of a statistical life (VSL) is
the individual’s money-risk tradeoff for small risks of death.”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at
51 (“With these [VSL] values, the government is not actually ‘valuing life.’ It is valuing the
reduction of mortality risks—typically by eliminating low-level risks, for example, risks of
1 in 100,000.”); Mortality Risk Valuation: What Does It Mean To Place A Value On Life?,
EPA, https:// www.epa.gov/ environmental-economics/ mortality- risk- valuation #
whatisvsl [https://perma.cc/97P3-5HNC] (“The EPA does not place a dollar value on
individual lives. Rather, when conducting a benefit-cost analysis of new environmental
policies, the Agency uses estimates of how much people are willing to pay for small
reductions in their risks of dying from adverse health conditions that may be caused by
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a mortality risk imposition does, in fact, involve an actual welfare
loss. Indeed, a 2010 EPA guidance document directly implies as
much:
Some EPA policies are designed to reduce the risk of
contracting a potentially fatal health effect such as
cancer. Reducing these risks of premature death
provides welfare increases to those individuals affected
by the policy. These policies generally provide
marginal changes in relatively small risks. . . . For
BCA, analysts generally aggregate these small risks
over the affected population to derive the number of
statistical lives saved (or the number of statistical
deaths avoided) and then use a ‘value of statistical life’
(VSL) to express these benefits in monetary terms.106
The most natural way of reading such statements by the
EPA, Viscusi, Sunstein, and others is that the mere imposition of
a mortality risk involves a welfare loss to the risk-bearer and it is
this welfare loss that drives individuals’ reported willingness to
pay to be free of small mortality risks.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that, absent
awareness or fear, the mere imposition of a mortality risk does
not involve an actual welfare loss to the risk-bearer, the question
is whether this means that such a risk imposition lacks moral
significance. If I point a partially loaded gun at your head while
you are asleep or unconscious and play Russian roulette, but no
bullet is fired, have I violated an interest of yours? Have I
wronged you? If you were later to view a film of the incident,
would you be justified in feeling moral outrage? The intuitive
answer to these questions seems to me clearly to be “Yes,” even
if the source of the wrong were not an actual welfare setback.107
If this intuition can be trusted, then it follows that, when a 1 in
100,000 risk of death imposed on 100,000 people results in one
environmental pollution. In the scientific literature, these estimates of willingness to pay for
small reductions in mortality risks are often referred to as the ‘value of a statistical life.’”).
106. NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., EPA, Appendix B: Mortality Risk Valuation
Estimates, in GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES B-1, B-1 (2014)
(emphasis added).
107. See, e.g., Aaron James, The Distinctive Significance of Systemic Risk, 30 RATIO
JURIS 239, 244 (2017) (“The interest we have in our exposure to risk is an objective interest
in its own right, which is not to be confused with or reduced to our separate interests in not
suffering the experience of risk exposure.”). I borrow the Russian roulette example from
James’s paper.
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person’s death, 99,999 people suffered a setback to a welfarerelated interest (even if not an actual welfare loss) and one person
suffered the welfare loss associated with death itself. If Adler and
Posner are correct that the $9 million VSL is intended to capture
the latter only, the former remains unaccounted for. Leaving risk
imposition out of the calculation in this way is hard to understand.
It is common sense that eliminating a mortality risk benefits every
person who would have been exposed to it, not just those unlucky
individuals who would have died were the risk to have
materialized.
In sum, the VSL does not persuasively monetize the welfare
loss associated with premature death itself. What it does
persuasively monetize is the welfare loss (or the setback to
welfare-related interests) associated with the imposition of a
small risk of premature death on a large number of people. And
even if the VSL does accurately capture the welfare loss
associated with the ex post harm of death, it then fails to capture
the ex ante interest setback resulting from the imposition of a
small risk of death on a large number of people. Either way, the
norm of maximizing overall well-being fails to persuasively
justify the use of the VSL in standard cost-benefit analysis of
mortality risk regulations, whether the type of mortality risk at
issue is a consumption risk (as in Arsenic (100,00)), a workplace
risk, or an environmental risk. The question then becomes
whether other norms might be able to do the job.

C. The Norm of Personal Autonomy
The notion of autonomy has played a central role in Western
moral philosophy, at least since Kant.108 Where the autonomy of
individual persons—rather than nations or other collective
entities—is concerned, it is commonplace to refer to “personal”
autonomy.109 An individual possesses personal autonomy to the
extent the individual is self-governing; that is, to the extent the

108. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE, in ETHICAL
PHILOSOPHY 44-54 (James W. Ellington trans., 1983) (1797).
109. See, e.g., Personal Autonomy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2018), http:// plato.
stanford. edu/ entries/ personal- autonomy [https://perma.cc/Y7MX-8RUV] (distinguishing
group autonomy from autonomy of an individual person).
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individual acts and lives in accordance with her own will.110 In
the words of the moral philosopher John Christman,
[T]o be autonomous is to be one’s own person, to be directed
by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics
that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part
of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self.
Autonomy in this sense seems an irrefutable value,
especially since its opposite—being guided by forces
external to the self and which one cannot authentically
embrace—seems to mark the height of oppression.111

Another contemporary moral philosopher, Shelly Kagan,
offers the following definition:
To have autonomy is to have the various aspects of one’s life
under one’s control. Typically, if I have autonomy over
some aspect of my life (whether my career, my hair color, or
how I spend this Thursday afternoon), then I can deliberate
concerning how I want that aspect of my life to go, choose
among the various alternatives open to me, and act so as to
make my life the way I want it to be in that regard.112

From the standpoint of morality, respect for a person’s
autonomy clearly seems to be one of the normative factors that
can determine the rightness or wrongness of a particular action.
Kagan puts this point in terms of a moral prohibition on
interfering with another’s autonomy:

110. See id. (“Autonomous agents are self-governing agents. . . . In short, every agent
has an authority over herself that is grounded, not in her political or social role, nor in any
law or custom, but in the simple fact that she alone can initiate her actions.”).
111. Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral [https://perma.cc/SW E9-Z6W2];
see also JOHN CHRISTMAN & JOEL ANDERSON, AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO
LIBERALISM 3 (2005). This definition of autonomy differs from that offered by Gerald
Dworkin in his influential study. Dworkin understands autonomy as “a second-order
capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and
so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order
preferences.” GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988).
The more traditional understanding of autonomy adopted by Christman and Kagan—and the
one I adopt in this article—seems to correspond roughly to what Dworkin calls “liberty.”
See id. at 14 (“Suppose we think of liberty as being, roughly, the ability of a person to do
what she wants, to have (significant) options that are not closed or made less eligible by the
actions of other agents.”).
112. KAGAN, supra note 41, at 111.
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One natural suggestion is that there should be a prohibition
against interfering with the autonomy of another. If I act in
such a way as to reduce, or to undermine, the control that
someone else has over their own life, then I harm them in a
profound way. My act fails to reflect the fact that my victim
has his own conception of how he wants his life to go and
that—but for my action—he would have been better able to
live as he has chosen.113

Alternatively, one can put the idea in terms of rights: an
individual has the right to determine for herself how her own life
will go and how she will or will not act in the world.114 Although
not absolute, this right of autonomy would seem to be entitled to
substantial respect, particularly where an action or decision
implicates the interests of the agent only, and not the interests of
any other person.

D. Personal Autonomy Justifies Use of a VSL
1. A Stylized Consumption Risk Scenario: Arsenic (1)
Suppose the government is deciding whether to enact an
arsenic regulation that would affect a single person, A (call this
Arsenic (1)). Suppose the regulation would eliminate a 1 in
100,000 risk of death to A at a cost of $200, which cost would be
entirely passed on to A in the form of an increase in A’s water
rates. Suppose further that, after closely studying consumptionand employment-related choices involving mortality risks in the
general population, the government concludes that very few
people would be willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a 1 in
100,000 risk of death. From the standpoint of autonomy, what is
the normative significance of that conclusion for the
government’s decision whether to enact the regulation at issue in
Arsenic (1)?
One possible claim is that, if very few people would be
willing to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 risk of death, then
enacting the arsenic regulation—which effectively forces A to
make that payment—would show a lack of respect for A’s

113. Id. at 291.
114. See Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, supra note 111.
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personal autonomy.115 This claim rests on the implicit inference
that, because few people in the general population would be
willing to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk, A
would not be willing to make that payment. This is, of course, a
non sequitur.116 A might be one of the few people who would be
willing to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk.
However, the government’s data arguably shows that, as to A or
any other individual in the general population, it is very unlikely
that the individual would be willing to make such a payment. If,
for some reason, information about A’s degree of mortality risk
aversion and risk-related preferences were unavailable, the
government might reasonably rely on such data to make a
determination about A.
Suppose one accepts the claim that, based on the
government’s data, it is highly unlikely that A would be willing
to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk. It would then
be reasonable to ask: assuming A would be unwilling to make
such a payment, what are the implications for whether it is
morally permissible for the government to enact the regulation in
Arsenic (1)?
To enact the regulation in such circumstances would seem to
be an unjustifiable violation of A’s personal autonomy. Because
A is the only person who would be affected by the regulation—
we are assuming that the associated cost and risk fall entirely on
her—the government could not base a decision to enact the
regulation on a need to safeguard the interests of any other person.
Because all of the costs and benefits associated with enacting or
not enacting the contemplated regulation fall on A and no one
else, the norm of personal autonomy is very strongly implicated,
115. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 93 (“Perhaps regulatory policy should not be
based on welfare. . . . Even if so, WTP might be defended on the ground of personal
autonomy. On this view, people should be sovereign over their own lives. Government
should respect people’s choices about how to use limited resources (again so long as those
choices are informed). When people decline to devote more than $90 to the elimination of
a 1/100,000 risk, it is because they would prefer to spend the money in a way that seems to
them more desirable. If regulators do not use people’s actual judgments, then they are
insulting their dignity.”); see also Viscusi, supra note 8, at 322 (“Although many noneconomists continue to attack the entire concept of monetizing risks to life, these implicit
tradeoffs are reflective of how people themselves value the risks and respect consumer
sovereignty in much the same way as do prices in other economic markets.” (emphasis
added)).
116. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 92-93.
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whereas norms like fairness and equity—which have to do with
the distribution of burdens and benefits among multiple persons
or parties—do not seem to be relevant. If, after informed
deliberation, A freely and voluntarily prefers a 1 in 100,000
mortality risk to a $200 cost, A’s right to be sovereign in matters
which affect her, and only her, interests would seem to have a
clear moral implication: to enact the regulation in Arsenic (1)
would be an unjustifiable violation of A’s personal autonomy.
It is important to note that, as presented above, the
autonomy-based case against regulating in Arsenic (1) is not
founded on a claim that A voluntarily consented to the mortality
risk associated with drinking water containing arsenic.117 The
argument is based on an assumption—made on the basis of
government data on the general population—about A’s general
preferences and behavior in the area of mortality risks. The
argument is not based on any specific decision A made after being
informed of the arsenic risk and asked to choose between taking
on the 1 in 100,000 mortality risk or paying the $200 cost.
Instead, the autonomy-based case against the regulation rests
implicitly on a claim that, had this choice been given to A, A
would have chosen to assume the risk rather than pay the cost. It
is, in other words, based on A’s hypothetical consent, not her
actual consent.118
In Arsenic (1), the autonomy-based case against regulating
seems relatively strong. It is not airtight, however. As noted
above, the case depends on the assumption that A is not one of
the very few people in the general population who would be
willing to pay $200 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk. But,
what if it turned out that A were a member of that tiny minority?
What if, given all the relevant information, A would freely and
deliberately choose to pay $200 rather than be exposed to a 1 in
100,000 risk of premature death? If that were true, it would seem
difficult to defend the choice not to regulate in Arsenic (1) on the
basis of autonomy. Choosing not to regulate—and thereby
imposing the risk rather than the cost on A—would run contrary
to A’s free and informed preferences.119 Because the regulation
117. See id.
118. For further discussion of the moral significance of hypothetical (as opposed to
actual) consent to a risk imposition, see infra Part II.D.2 & text accompanying notes 142-44.
119. See Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, supra note 111.
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affects A and A alone, this would, arguably, violate A’s right to
sovereignty over her own life.120
In such a case, the government might offer an alternative
justification for choosing not to regulate: welfare maximization.
The government could claim that A’s preference for paying $200
rather than accepting a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk, despite being
informed, voluntary, and free, is irrational because, as a matter of
fact, paying the cost would leave A worse off than being exposed
to the risk. The government might defend that conclusion on the
basis of its general population data by claiming that the fact that
the vast majority of people prefer a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk to
a $200 cost shows that all people would be better off bearing the
risk than bearing the cost. On this view, the few people who
prefer the cost to the risk are guilty of what Cass Sunstein has
termed “miswanting”: freely and voluntarily preferring
something contrary to their own best interests.121 If this is so, the
government might defend a decision not to regulate in Arsenic (1)
as an instance of justifiable paternalism,122 one similar to the
government’s requirement that occupants of moving automobiles
wear seatbelts. Some people might make a free and informed
decision not to wear a seatbelt when driving. But, by requiring all
drivers and passengers to wear a seatbelt, the government
effectively deems such a decision to be irrational. It deems the
preference for not wearing a seatbelt to be an instance of
miswanting, one that can therefore be justifiably overridden in
order to maximize the well-being of the miswanter.

120. Id.
121. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 118-22 (discussing phenomena of “miswanting”
and informational and behavioral market failures); see also Adler and Posner, supra note 43,
at 1116-22 (discussing phenomena of uninformed preferences, adaptive preferences, and
objectively bad preferences).
122. See KAGAN, supra note 41, at 112 (“Prohibitions against paternalism rule out
interfering with another’s autonomy . . . [by] forcing someone to do what’s best for
himself.”); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 321 (1984) (“We are paternalists when
we force someone act in his own interests. It provides some justification for paternalism,
when this involves coercion or the infringement of someone’s autonomy, if we are stopping
this person from acting irrationally.”).
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2. A More Realistic Scenario: Arsenic (100,000)
The next question is whether the autonomy-based case
against regulation loses any of its force when we move from
Arsenic (1) to the more realistic case of Arsenic (100,000), in
which an arsenic mortality risk of identical magnitude—1 in
100,000—is imposed on 100,000 consumers. As above, suppose
this risk could be eliminated at a total cost of $20 million, which
would be entirely passed on to the risk-bearing consumers in the
form of a $200-per-capita cost. As with Arsenic (1), it should be
assumed that the government’s regulatory decision is based on
general population data showing that very few people would be
willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality
risk.
From an autonomy standpoint, enacting the regulation in
Arsenic (100,000) features 100,000 instances of the autonomy
violation involved in enacting the regulation in Arsenic (1).
Arguably, if enacting the regulation in Arsenic (1) is wrong
because it would unjustifiably violate the autonomy of one
person, then enacting the regulation in Arsenic (100,000) is
egregiously wrong because it would unjustifiably violate the
autonomy of 100,000 people.
Unlike in Arsenic (1), however, the norm of maximizing
overall well-being arguably favors a choice to regulate in Arsenic
(100,000). Where the risk in question would fall on 100,000
people, rather than one person, not enacting the regulation would
be expected to result not just in the imposition of a very small risk
of death on one person (as in Arsenic (1)), but rather in a single
premature death, one which could be prevented by distributing a
$20 million cost among 100,000 people. For reasons discussed
in the previous section, it is not at all clear that overall well-being
would be greater in a world featuring both the imposition of a 1
in 100,000 risk on 100,000 people and the risk’s materialization
in one expected premature death than it would be in a world
featuring the imposition of a $200 cost on each of 100,000 people.
There may, in fact, be good reason to believe that the welfaremaximizing course of action would be to impose the $20 million
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cost, thereby not only sparing 100,000 people from the risk
imposition but also sparing one person from premature death.123
A decision to regulate in Arsenic (100,000) might also be
defended on the basis of fairness. In Arsenic (100,000), it is clear
from an ex ante point of view that someone would probably be
killed were the regulation not enacted.124 It is not as though this
is a single-person case (like Arsenic (1)), in which it is highly
unlikely that the risk will materialize in anyone’s death. In
Arsenic (100,000), it is probable that at least one person will die.
Therefore, it might be argued, it is not just a matter of respecting
the autonomy interests of a group of 100,000 individuals, all of
whom are identically situated with respect to the risk imposition
in question. It is a matter of fairly balancing the interests of the
100,000 people affected ex ante against those of the one person
likely to be fatally affected ex post. Thus, this situation is,
arguably, not relevantly different from one in which 100,000
town residents are each asked to pay $200 to subsidize the $20
million rescue of a miner trapped at the bottom of the town mine
(call this Trapped Miner). In both cases, it would arguably be
unfair to allow the death of one person to occur simply to spare
each of 100,000 people from having to pay a cost of $200. In
both cases, each of the 100,000 cost-bearers can, on the basis of
the norm of fairness, justifiably be required to invest $200 to save
a life.125 Thus, even if the welfare maximization case for
123. Of course, to say that the imposition of a 1 in 100,000 risk of death on 100,000
people would be expected to result in the death of one person is not to say that there is a
100% chance of it doing so. As to each risk-bearer, there is a 99.999% (.99999/1) chance
that the imposition will not result in death. The chance that the risk imposition will not result
in any risk-bearer’s death is therefore .99999100,000 or roughly 36.8%. Thus, imposing a 1 in
100,000 risk of death on 100,000 people creates roughly a 63.2% chance of at least one death.
The chance that exactly one death will occur is roughly 36.8% (.99999 99,999 x (.00001) x
(100,000)), while the chance that two or more deaths will occur is roughly 26.4%.
124. See Sophia Reibetanz, Contractualism and Aggregation, 108 ETHICS 296, 303304 (1998).
125. The analogy between Trapped Miner and Arsenic (100,000) assumes that it
makes no difference whether, at the time the decision must be made, the cost-bearers know
the identity of the person who will die unless action is taken. Trapped Miner involves saving
an identified life, whereas Arsenic (100,000) involves saving a statistical life. The analogy
between the two situations therefore rests on the implicit claim that this difference ought not
to be significant for purposes of determining the right course of action in either case. The
critique of the analogy in the following paragraph does not take issue with this claim.
Instead, it focuses on a different dissimilarity between the two situations: that, in Arsenic
(100,000), the $200-per-capita investment eliminates a mortality risk to each cost-bearer and
would be expected to save the life of one cost-bearer; by contrast, in Trapped Miner, the
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regulating in Arsenic (100,000) were deemed uncertain—after all,
who can really say whether one premature death would decrease
overall well-being by more than imposing a $200 cost on each of
100,000 people would?—fairness might provide an alternative
basis for doing so.
However, there is a way of meeting this fairness-based
argument. To begin with, Trapped Miner is importantly different
from Arsenic (100,000). In Trapped Miner, because the 100,000
cost-bearing individuals are not faced with a choice of whether to
invest $200 in their own safety, the norm of personal autonomy is
not implicated in the same way it is in Arsenic (100,000). One
could not say to the trapped miner’s family that saving their loved
one’s life would have required forcing their loved one to make an
investment in her own safety that, from an ex ante standpoint, she
could not rationally have wished to make. But, this is precisely
the sort of justification that could be offered to the family of the
deceased water consumer in Arsenic (100,000).126 Such a
justification would focus on the point that, not only would
preventing the death have required unjustifiably violating the
autonomy of 100,000 people, but further that the unlucky victim
would have been among those whose autonomy would have been
violated.127 “Knowing what she knew at the time the regulatory
decision was made,” one might say to the family, “your loved one
herself could not rationally have wished to pay her share of the
cost of eliminating the risk that materialized in her death.
Preventing your loved one’s death would have meant forcing her
to engage in an irrational transaction: paying $200 for a safety
benefit worth just $90. Thus, arguing that fairness required
enacting the life-saving regulation is tantamount to arguing—
rather absurdly—that it would have been unfair to your loved one
ex post not to have disrespected her autonomy ex ante.” Of
$200-per-capita investment would not have any effect on the mortality risks facing costbearers, nor would it save the life of any cost-bearer.
126. I borrow this analytical device from Sophia Reibetanz Moreau. See Reibetanz,
supra note 124, at 303-04.
127. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 115 (“When people decline to devote more than
$60 to the elimination of a 1/100,000 risk, it is because they would like to spend the money
in a way that seems to them more desirable. If regulators do not use people’s actual
judgments, then they are insulting their autonomy. Suppose that people in a free society are
entitled to have a kind of mastery over the conduct of their own lives. If so, then they should
be permitted to make such allocations as they choose.”).
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course, one might still insist that, for welfare maximization
reasons, the regulation should be enacted, notwithstanding the
autonomy-based reasons for opening it. However, given the
apparent strength of the autonomy-based case against regulation,
it is at least highly questionable whether this welfare
maximization argument should prevail.
In Arsenic (100,000), we saw that the government’s
regulatory decision was based not on risk-bearers’ actual choice
to assume a mortality risk rather than the pay the cost of
eliminating the risk, but rather on studies of risk aversion and
other risk-related preferences in the general population.128 This
reflects the way in which decisions are actually made by federal
agencies when regulating mortality risks: they are based on
studies of the amount persons in the general population are
willing to pay to avoid small mortality risks.129 Based on this sort
of general information, we saw that an inference could be made
about what the persons actually affected by a particular regulation
(i.e., the 100,000 risk-bearers in Arsenic (100,000)) would have
preferred with respect to the mortality risk in question. More
specifically, we saw that, based on the general population date, it
was reasonable to infer that each risk-bearer in those cases would
very likely have preferred being exposed to the 1 in 100,000
mortality risk to paying the $200 cost of eliminating that risk.
Thus, the autonomy-based argument against regulating was
founded on hypothetical consent to the mortality risk in question,
not actual consent.
The question, then, is whether and to what extent the
autonomy-based case against regulation in Arsenic (100,000)
suffers by virtue of being based on hypothetical rather than actual
consent. On one hand, the norm of autonomy seems to be more
strongly implicated when an informed, free, and voluntary
decision to assume (or pay to avoid) a particular mortality risk has
actually been made by each potential risk-bearer130 than it is
128. See supra Part II.D.2.
129. See, e.g., EPA Analysis, supra note 15, § 5.4.2, at 5-24 (“VSL does not refer to
the value of an identifiable life, but instead to the value of small reductions in mortality risks
in a population. . . . VSL estimates are appropriate only for valuing small changes in risk;
they are not values for saving a particular individual’s life.”); see also supra Part I.A.
130. The connection between autonomy and actual consent is a strong one. See
KAGAN, supra note 41, at 292 (“[I]f a person consents to a given form of treatment, then
typically, at least, being treated in that way will not constitute a violation of autonomy. For
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when, on the basis of data about the general population’s risk
aversion and preferences, a determination is made about what
each risk-bearer would have decided in that regard.131 On the
other hand, I believe it would be a mistake to think that the
absence of an actual decision by risk-bearers about whether to
assume the risk in question means that the norm of autonomy is
not implicated at all.132 It would be a mistake, in other words, to
think that a plausible determination as to what risk-bearers would
have preferred under the circumstances should have no
implications for whether the course of action under consideration
would respect the risk-bearers’ autonomy.133
To see why, suppose the government were trying to decide
whether to enact a regulation that would eliminate a 1 in 100,000
risk of death to 100,000 people at a cost of $20,000 to each riskbearer (for a total cost of $2 billion). In such circumstances,
should the government be required to actually put the question
before each risk-bearer—and receive a negative answer from each
one—in order to be able to defend a decision not to regulate on
the basis of autonomy? It seems not. The fact that it is highly
plausible to suppose that no risk-bearer would be willing to pay
$20,000 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk supplies ample
reason to believe that imposing the cost, rather than the risk,
would violate the autonomy of each risk-bearer, even if it is not
known for certain whether any of the risk-bearers actually is
willing to do so. Enacting a regulation that the risk-bearers would
almost certainly have objected to is little different from enacting
a regulation that they actually objected to. If the latter would
violate their autonomy, then the former arguably would too.

example, if I harm you with your permission, or if I fail to act on a promise from which you
have released me, this doesn’t actually interfere with your autonomy: you are still in control
of your life, deciding how it is to go.”).
131. See P.J. Thomas, Measuring Risk-Aversion: The Challenge, 79 MEASUREMENT
285, 285-86 (2016).
132. See DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 88-89 (noting that, while hypothetical consent
“is not actual consent” and “is simply a judgment about what the agent would have agreed
to under certain circumstances,” hypothetical consent “appeal[s] to consent or something like
consent in explaining the obligations and rights [it] create[s]”).
133. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 115 (“When people decline to devote more than
$60 to the elimination of a 1/100,000 risk, it is because they would like to spend the money
in a way that seems to them more desirable. If regulators do not use people’s actual
judgments, then they are insulting their autonomy.”).
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In Arsenic (100,000), by hypothesis, the general population
data on which the government’s willingness-to-pay
determinations were based established that very few people would
be willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a mortality risk of 1 in
100,000. If that were true, it would follow that enacting the
regulation would mean requiring the vast majority of risk-bearers
to pay $200 to avoid a mortality risk that, if given a choice, they
would have instead chosen to assume. Arguably, this would
disrespect the personal autonomy of the vast majority of riskbearers. The fact that a decision not to regulate in Arsenic
(100,000) is based on hypothetical rather than actual consent does
not seem to undermine, in any significant way, an argument that
this decision can be defended on the basis of autonomy.
Of course, autonomy works as a justification for using a VSL
to guide the regulation of consumption risks only to the extent the
government’s willingness-to-pay data provides a secure basis for
determining what the risk-bearers would or would not have
consented to in a given set of circumstances. The urgent
questions therefore become epistemic ones. In a given instance,
how sure can the government be of the accuracy of its
determinations about what risk-bearers would or would not have
consented to under the circumstances? How can the government
make its willingness-to-pay determinations sensitive to the fact
that risk preferences will inevitably vary across different types of
mortality risks,134 as well as across different individuals
depending on, among other factors, their wealth, socioeconomic
status, age, and cultural preferences?135 Even assuming the
government were able to achieve a high degree of individuation
regarding the willingness-to-pay preferences among a given
group of risk-bearers, what figure should the government rely on
in regulating the risk at issue: the average willingness-to-pay, the
median willingness-to-pay, or some other statistical figure?
Proponents of mortality risk CBA often speak in terms of average
or median WTP of the risk-bearing population,136 though other
134. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 96-101; Viscusi, supra note 10, at 152-69.
135. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 101-06; Viscusi, supra note 10, at 117-20, 13334.
136. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 95 (“[I]t would be grossly misleading to
offer the following suggestion: The value of a statistical life is $9 million. It would be much
more accurate to say that for risks of 1/10,000, the median WTP in the relevant population
is $900—or that for risks of 1/100,000, the median WTP is $90.”); Posner & Sunstein, supra
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like-minded commentators appear to suggest that the relevant
WTP is uniform.137 If the basis of mortality risk CBA is
autonomy, rather than welfare, it is difficult to see how the
average or median WTP of the risk-bearing population could be
a legitimate basis on which to set regulatory levels, because
regulatory decisions would presumably contravene the
preferences of the substantial proportion of risk-bearers with
above-average or above-median risk aversion preferences.
These epistemic inquiries, although critically important, lie
beyond the scope of this article. The discussion above establishes
that, assuming the government can say with a reasonable degree
of certainty how much money the persons exposed to a given
consumption risk would have been willing to pay to avoid that
risk, personal autonomy provides a sound normative basis—and
seemingly the only sound normative basis—for using a VSL to
guide the regulation of such a risk. This is a significant
conclusion, one which challenges both the claim that using a VSL
in mortality risk regulation has no normative basis in any moral
context138 and the claim that use of a VSL in the moral context of
consumption risks can be defended on the basis of maximizing
overall well-being.139

III. WORKPLACE RISKS AND EQUITY
Commonly, an industrial activity poses a risk of death to a
group of persons that benefits meaningfully from the activity, but
does not bear any significant share of the costs of complying with
regulations that reduce the risk.140 Workplace risks are perhaps
note 26, at 551 (“Suppose, for example, that workers must be paid $[9]00, on average, to
eliminate a risk of 1/10,000. If so, the value of a statistical life would be said to be $[9]
million.”); Posner, supra note 36, at 324 (“Suppose that it is discovered by studies of people’s
behavior that the average person would be willing to incur a maximum cost of $1 to avoid
the one-in-a-million chance of being killed by some hazard that a proposed project would
eliminate.”).
137. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 36, at 105 (“[A] group of 10,000 people facing an
individual risk of death of 1/10,000 will incur one expected fatality in the group. If each
person is willing to pay $500 to eliminate the risk, then there is a collective willingness to
pay $5 million to eliminate the one statistical death.” (emphasis added)).
138. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8.
139. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
140. Sunstein calls risk impositions of this type “harder cases,” since such cases tend
to be more difficult to analyze than cases in which the persons exposed to a risk also bear the
costs of reducing it. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 127 (“There is an obvious artificiality
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the best example of this type of risk imposition.141 Many
industries employ production processes that pose serious health
risks to workers in those industries. For example, many industries
use toxic chemicals that pose a risk of death or serious illness to
the workers exposed to the chemicals in the course of performing
their job duties.142 As with consumption risks, all or substantially
all of the costs of complying with government regulations
designed to reduce workplace risks tend to be passed on to
consumers in the form of price increases or deducted from
shareholder profits.143 When this occurs, the group of people
exposed to the risk in question (workers) is not the same group
responsible for paying the costs of reducing that risk (consumers
or shareholders).
This is what makes workplace risks
fundamentally different from consumption risks from a normative
standpoint. Although workers obviously benefit from the
industrial activity that places them at risk (because it provides
them with gainful employment), the burden of complying with
risk-reducing regulations tends to fall on others. These features
in the assumptions thus far. Most important, people do not always bear the full social costs
of the regulatory benefits that they receive. . . . When this is so, the analysis is much more
complicated.”).
141. However, environmental risks might also exhibit this structure. For example, the
persons living in proximity to a plant that emitted carcinogenic fumes into the air might
significantly benefit from the risk-generating industry, whether by consuming its products
or in some other way. See, e.g., id. at 127-28 (offering air pollution regulation as an example
of a case in which those exposed to the risk at issue do not bear the costs of regulations that
reduce the risk).
142. A prominent example is the use of benzene in the oil refining industry. Benzene
poses a cancer risk to workers exposed in the course of their duties. See Indus. Union Dep’t.
v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 613 (1980) (discussing OSHA’s regulation of
workplace exposure to benzene).
143. See Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupational
Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5237 (Jan. 22, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1990)
(“The public, by and large, equally benefitted from and paid the costs for cleaner
water. . . . However, in the case of occupational safety and health, different groups enjoy the
economic savings of not regulating and take the risks. Consumers save through lower prices
and employers benefit through higher profits from not regulating, while risks are borne by
workers, often in the lower economic groups. Therefore, occupational safety and health
posed an ‘equity’ question.” (emphasis added)) (summarizing testimony of Dr. Nicholas
Ashford of MIT); see also Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg.
10100, at 10280-281 (Feb. 28, 2006) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917,
1918, & 1926) (“Price elasticity refers to the relationship between the price charged for a
service and the demand for that service; that is, the more elastic the relationship, the less able
is an establishment to pass the costs of compliance through to its customers in the form of a
price increase and the more it will have to absorb the costs of compliance from its profits.”).
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of the typical workplace risk create a particular moral context, one
that is relevant to the justifiability of using a VSL to guide
mortality risk regulation. In this Part, I argue that, when it comes
to risks exhibiting this structure, using the basic concept of
individual willingness-to-pay to guide mortality risk regulation is
morally defensible on the basis of the norm of equity.144
However, using a VSL to guide mortality risk CBA is not
defensible in this context because it relies on a collective, rather
than individual, willingness-to-pay determination.

A. Example: Chromium in the Workplace
Hexavalent chromium (Cr(VI)) is a toxic substance used in
a number of industries.145 Compounds containing chromium are
used intentionally to perform metal electroplating and to produce
chemical catalysts and pigments for textile dyes, paints, inks,
glass, and plastics.146 Chromium compounds are also formed
incidentally as a byproduct of certain welding processes and as an
impurity found in portland cement.147 According to OSHA, there
are over 30 industry sectors in which workers may be exposed to
chromium.148
Compounds containing chromium can exist in mist, dust, or
fume form, and have long been known to pose health risks to
workers when inhaled or upon contact with skin.149 Most
significantly, exposure to chromium can cause lung cancer, which

144. Cf. Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupational
Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. at 5237, 5239 (“[O]ccupational safety and health pose[s] an
‘equity’ question. . . . [OSHA believes that] as a matter of policy, efficiency criteria alone
are not appropriate because they ignore equity considerations. The economic savings from
less protective regulation accrue to industry in the form of higher profits and consumers in
the form of lower prices. But the costs are borne by workers through increased industrial
illness and death rates.”); Waisman, supra note 19, at 1265-67 (arguing feasibility-based
regulation of workplace mortality risks is defensible on the basis of the norm of equity).
145. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, 557 F.3d 165,
169 (3d Cir. 2009) (denying petition challenging OSHA’s regulation of hexavalent
chromium except with respect to the employee notification aspects of the standard).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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is often fatal.150 Chromium exposure can also cause nonfatal
ailments such as asthma, dermatitis, nasal irritation, and
gastrointestinal ulcers.151
In 1971, OSHA set a permissible exposure level for
chromium of 52 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3).152 By 2004,
chromium’s carcinogenic properties had become clear, and
OSHA consequently proposed reducing the chromium exposure
standard to 1 µg/m3.153 In 2006, after extensive comments and
hearings, OSHA issued its final rule, which set a somewhat higher
chromium PEL of 5 µg/m3.154 This was the exposure level that
OSHA ultimately found to satisfy the feasibility standard
applicable under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.155
As part of its analysis, OSHA calculated the annual costs and
monetized benefits of setting the chromium PEL at the various
alternative levels it was considering.156 The benefits included the
prevention of both fatal and nonfatal cancers.157 To monetize the
avoidance of fatal cancers, OSHA adopted the EPA’s thenprevailing $6.8 million VSL; to monetize the avoidance of
nonfatal cancers, OSHA employed an analysis based on both the
VSL and a cost-of-illness approach.158 Discounting costs and

150. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 557 F.3d at 169-70; see also Occupational
Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10100, 10224 (Feb. 28, 2006) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, & 1926).
151. Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10108, 10166,
10174.
152. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 557 F.3d at 169.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012) (providing that, in promulgating
regulatory standards for toxic materials or other hazardous substances, OSHA “shall set the
standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity” (emphasis added)).
156. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10305,
10307.
157. See id. at 10305. Based on various scientific studies OSHA considered, it
estimated ranges of the annual cancer-prevention benefits of setting the chromium PEL at
the various alternative levels it was considering. For annual avoided lung cancer deaths, the
reported ranges for each PEL were as follows: .25 µg/m3: 66-258; .5 µg/m3: 62-243; 1 µg/m3:
58-224; 5 µg/m3: 40-145; 10 µg/m3: 27-95; 20 µg/m3: 15-47. Id. at 10304, tbl.VIII-10. For
annual avoided non-fatal cancers, the reported ranges for each PEL were as follows: .25
µg/m3: 9-35; .5 µg/m3: 8-33; 1 µg/m3: 8-31; 5 µg/m3: 5-20; 10 µg/m3: 4-13: 20 µg/m3: 2-6.
Id.
158. See id. at 10305, 10307.
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median monetized benefits by 7%,159 OSHA determined that the
greatest net benefit ($6 million) would be realized at a chromium
PEL of 10 µg/m3.160 Discounting costs and median monetized
benefits by 3%, the greatest net benefit ($231 million) would be
realized at a PEL of 5 µg/m3.161 Although the 5 µg/m3 level may
not have been cost-justified, OSHA fixed the chromium PEL at
that level because, in its feasibility analysis, OSHA determined
the 5 µg/m3 level to be the lowest PEL economically and
technologically feasible.162
As noted above, OSHA was
mandated by federal statute to set the chromium PEL at the lowest
feasible level.163
OSHA determined that regulatory costs will generally either
be passed on to consumers in the form of price increases, or
absorbed by firms in the form of reductions to profits.164 From
OSHA’s chromium report, it is difficult to determine either the
proportion of regulatory costs that would be passed through to
consumers or the amount of any per-unit price increases by which
such pass-throughs would be accomplished. OSHA report does
provide some helpful information, however. OSHA determined
that firms in over 30 different industry sectors would be affected
by the new chromium regulation.165 Many of the firms in these
industry sectors—e.g., those in the welding and construction
sectors—may primarily serve other businesses, rather than
individual consumers, so there may be multiple cost pass-

159. OSHA relied on an assumption of a 7% discount rate in its analysis of costs,
adding an alternative 3% discount rate calculation as part of what it called a “sensitivity
analysis” when calculating net monetized benefits. See id. at 10263 (“[A]ll costs are
annualized at a discount rate of 7 percent. (A sensitivity analysis using a discount rate of 3
percent is presented in the discussion of net benefits.).”).
160. See id. at 10306, tbl.VIII-11, 10308, tbl.VIII-12.
161. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10306,
tbl.VIII-11, 10308, tbl.VIII-12.
162. Elsewhere, I have argued that the 5 µg/m3 chromium PEL on which OSHA settled
was normatively defensible on the basis of equity. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1306-12.
163. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012).
164. See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at
10280-81 (“Price elasticity refers to the relationship between the price charged for a service
and the demand for that service; that is, the more elastic the relationship, the less able is an
establishment to pass the costs of compliance through to its customers in the form of a price
increase and the more it will have to absorb the costs of compliance from its profits.”).
165. See id. at 10272-82, tbl.VIII-7.
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throughs to take into account before a regulatory cost reaches an
individual “end user.”166
Thus, OSHA’s regulation of chromium exposure exhibits
the structure of the typical workplace risk.167 The risky activity
at issue—industrial use of chromium—provides a benefit to each
risk-bearing worker (in the form of gainful employment) and to
each cost-bearing consumer (in the form of a desirable product).
Moreover, as OSHA noted, the costs of complying with
chromium regulation would likely be passed on either to
consumers of the regulated industries in the form of price
increases or to shareholders of firms in those industries in the
form of reductions to profits.168 Thus, the workers exposed to
cancer risks from chromium exposure benefit significantly from
the industrial activity that gives rise to those risks, but do not bear
the costs of compliance with regulations that reduce those risks.
This makes the cancer risk posed by chromium exposure a good
real-world example of a workplace risk.

B. The Norm of Equity and (Ex Ante) Contractualism
The term equity is defined in Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary as “a free and reasonable conformity to
accepted standards of natural right, law, and justice without
prejudice, favoritism, or fraud and without rigor entailing undue
hardship.”169 Although often taken to be synonymous with
fairness,170 equity, as its etymology suggests, specifically
connotes the aspect of fairness that has to do with equality.171
“[T]he essence of Justice or Equity,” observed renowned moral
philosopher Henry Sidgwick, “is that different individuals are not
to be treated differently, except on grounds of universal

166. See sources cited supra note 143.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 152-66.
168. See Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10280-82.
169. Equity, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002).
Throughout this Article, I use the term in this more popular sense, rather than in the technical
legal sense that refers to the legal system and body of principles originating in the English
Court of Chancery.
170. See, e.g., Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining equity as
“[f]airness; impartiality; evenhanded dealing”).
171. The term derives from the Latin words aequitas (“equality”) and aequus
(“equal”). See Equity, supra note 169.
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application.”172 Equity is therefore a somewhat narrower concept
than fairness, as it is specifically concerned with achieving
fairness in the distribution of burdens and benefits.173 Equity, as
I understand the term here, is broadly concerned with equalizing
the burdens borne by differently-situated individuals as the result
of some socially desirable act, practice, or policy.174
Like the norm of fairness, the norm of equity presupposes
the evaluation of an action or policy from the point of view of
each affected individual, rather than an impersonal evaluation
from a “view from nowhere” or “God’s eye” perspective.175
When determining whether an action or policy is equitable, one
is implicitly and necessarily asking whether it is equitable to a
particular affected party or to each and every affected party.176 It
is impossible to determine whether an action, policy, or rule is
equitable, in a general sense, without assessing and comparing its
impact on each affected individual.177 This is to be contrasted
with norms like overall well-being or efficiency, which do not
require that the perspective of each affected individual be
consulted and considered.178 It would not make sense, for
example, to ask whether an action or policy maximizes overall
well-being to or from the standpoint of a particular party.

172. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 496 (1930).
173. By contrast, one can intelligibly speak of fairness in a non-distributive sense. For
example, consider the notions of “fair play,” see, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (observing that an assertion of personal jurisdiction must not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (citation omitted)), and “unfair
surprise,” see, e.g., 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 18:7 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing notion of “unfair surprise” in the context
of the unconscionability doctrine in contract law).
174. See SIDGWICK, supra note 172, at 496-97.
175. See, e.g., John Broome, Fairness, 91 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 87, 87-96
(1991) (“Fairness is concerned only with how well each person’s claim is satisfied compared
with how well other people’s are satisfied. It is concerned with relative satisfaction, not
absolute satisfaction.” (emphasis omitted)).
176. This is reflected in the famous definition of justice offered by the Roman jurist
Ulpian: “Justice is the constant and perpetual will to allot to every man his due.” A.B. Neil,
Justice and Natural Law, 22 TENN. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1951) (translating DIG. 1.1.10
(Ulpian, Regularum 1) (“Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique
tribuendi.”)).
177. See Frick, supra note 42, at 221.
178. See id. (“[E]quity is an ‘individualistic’ moral notion. Being equitable is a
property that attaches to actions, not in virtue of their overall or aggregate effects, but in
virtue of how they treat each person individually.”).
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However, what exactly equity requires in a particular case
may not be deducible from these rather abstract observations. For
purposes of my analysis in this article, I therefore adopt a
particular interpretation of the notion of equity. Specifically, I
will hold an action, practice, policy, or rule to be equitable if and
only if it would be permitted by contractualism.179 Introduced by
the philosopher T.M. Scanlon in 1982,180 contractualism is a
relatively new theory of normative ethics founded on the social
contract tradition in political philosophy (embodied in the work
of Locke,181 Rousseau,182 and Rawls183) and on the Kantian
tradition in moral philosophy.184
Contractualism is not a general theory of morality, but rather
a theory of interpersonal morality or, to use Scanlon’s famous
phrase, of “what we owe to each other.”185 In this area of
morality, Scanlon intended contractualism to offer an account of
what it means for an action to be wrong.186 In this article, I follow
an alternative interpretation of contractualism, one originally
offered by Derek Parfit and since endorsed by other
philosophers.187
The alternative interpretation holds that
contractualism specifies a wrong-making property of an action,
rather than explaining what it means for an action to be wrong.188
On this view, an action might be wrong for non-contractualist
reasons, or it might be wrong from a contractualist point of view
but right all things considered.189 This interpretation of
179. See id. at 220-21 (arguing that the notion of equity best captures the “wrongmaking property” that contractualism specifies).
180. See generally T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998)
(especially Chapter 5, pp. 189-247) [hereinafter SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE]; T.M. Scanlon,
Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103, 103-14 (Amartya
Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) [hereinafter Scanlon, Contractualism].
181. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Richard H.
Cox ed., Harlan Davidson 1982) (1690).
182. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in BASIC
POLITICAL WRITINGS 153-252 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 2011).
183. See generally RAWLS, supra note 40.
184. See generally KANT, supra note 108, at 44-54.
185. Thus, contractualism does not directly address questions of political morality, the
moral strictures applicable to the actions and policies of coercive institutions, nor does it
address our moral obligations to animals or future persons.
186. See Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 180, at 110.
187. See 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS 368-70 (Samuel Scheffler ed. 2011);
Frick, supra note 42, at 220.
188. Frick, supra note 42, at 220.
189. See id. at 222.
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contractualism obviously squares well with normative pluralism.
For the pluralist, contractualism specifies the requirements of
equity, which is one of the normative factors that can determine
the rightness or wrongness of an action.
According to contractualism, “an act is wrong if its
performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any
set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general
agreement.”190 What exactly does that mean? An example will
be a useful place to start in answering this question.
Suppose the government is deciding between two different
policies with which to accomplish a particular goal, Policy One
and Policy Two. (Call this Policy Choice.) Both policies will
affect a group of 1 million people, Group A, and a separate group
of 100 people, Group B. At the time of the government’s
decision, all members of both groups enjoy roughly equal levels
of well-being and all members of both groups enjoy a decent,
intermediate standard of living. Policy One would leave members
of Group A much better off by increasing their standard of living
from decent to high, but would leave members of Group B much
worse off by lowering their standard of living from decent to low.
Policy Two would leave members of Group A slightly better off
by making a very small improvement in their standard of living,
but would leave members of Group B slightly worse off by
making a very small reduction in their standard of living. From a
normative point of view, which policy should the government
adopt?
The norm of welfare maximization provides a normative
basis for choosing Policy One. The welfare-maximizing policy is
the policy under which the aggregate (overall) well-being of all
affected persons is greater than it would be under any alternative
policy.191 In the above example, following this norm would mean
190. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 180, at 153.
191. The norm of welfare maximization, as I understand it here, is essentially
equivalent to classical utilitarianism, except that it holds that the goodness of the outcome of
an action or policy is to be evaluated on the basis of how it affects the well-being of
individuals, rather than on how much pleasure or pain it produces. See Consequentialism,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 22, 2015), https:// plato.stanf ord.edu/ entries/
consequentialism/ [https://perma.cc/68Z7-9F6E] (“When a welfarist theory of value is
combined with the other elements of classic utilitarianism, the resulting theory can be called
welfarist consequentialism.”).
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calculating the net aggregate gain (or loss) in welfare associated
with each policy, and choosing the policy that delivers the greater
net gain (or smaller net loss) to aggregate welfare. It seems clear
that both policies would increase aggregate welfare on net. This
follows from the fact that, while each policy would result in a
reduction in the well-being of 100 people (Group B), each policy
would also deliver an equally-sized increase to the well-being of
1 million people (Group A). For this reason, both policies would,
from a welfare maximization point of view, plausibly result in a
net improvement over the status quo.192 The question is which
policy delivers the bigger improvement, i.e., the greater increase
to overall well-being.193 On that question, it seems clear that
Policy One wins out. While Policy One would make each Group
A member much better off, Policy Two would make each Group
A member only slightly better off. Were Group A the only group
of people affected, it is clear that Policy One would result in a
significantly greater increase in aggregate well-being than Policy
Two would. Does this change when the policies’ respective
effects on Group B are taken into consideration? Almost certainly
not. Although Policy One would leave members of Group B
worse off than Policy Two would, Group B is only a tiny fraction
(1/10,000) of the size of Group A. The policies’ respective effects
on 100-person Group B therefore play a negligible role in
determining how they would each affect the aggregate well-being
of all 1,000,100 affected persons. For these reasons, Policy One
would deliver a greater net increase to aggregate well-being than
Policy Two would (or so I am assuming). The norm of welfare
maximization therefore favors Policy One.
Contractualism provides a normative basis for choosing
Policy Two. Contractualists believe that the normatively
appropriate policy is the one that could be justified not to the
entire group of affected persons considered as a whole, but to
each affected person in light of how the policy, and the available
alternatives, would affect him or her.194 To use contractualist

192. To put this point in the language of welfare economics: although neither policy
would represent a Pareto improvement over the status quo, both policies would result in a
Kaldor-Hicks improvement.
193. See Consequentialism, supra note 191.
194. See Contractualism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 2, 2012), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/ [https://perma.cc/SH9C-YUBJ].
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language, the morally permissible policy is the one permitted by
a principle that no person could reasonably reject.195 Policy One
is not justifiable to members of Group B because there is an
alternative policy—Policy Two—under which no person is left as
bad off as members of Group B would be left under Policy One.
A contractualist would maintain that members of Group B could,
on that basis, reasonably reject a principle licensing Policy One,
making Policy One morally impermissible. Members of Group
A might wish to reject a principle permitting Policy Two in favor
of Policy One, but they could not reasonably do so, as they would
implicitly be asking each member of Group B to put up with being
left substantially worse off (rather than only slightly worse off) so
that each member of Group A can avoid being left only slightly
better off (rather than substantially better off).
The contractualist criterion of moral rightness involves three
core ideas: (i) the idea that interpersonal morality presupposes the
requirement of justifiability to each affected person considered
as an individual, rather than the requirement of justifiability to all
affected persons considered in the aggregate;196 (ii) the idea that
the moral status of a particular act (its rightness or wrongness) is
a function of the moral validity of the general principle licensing
the act;197 and (iii) tying together the first two tenets, the idea that
a principle is justifiable to each person if and only if it would
command the free assent of all persons, i.e., if and only if no
person could reasonably reject it as a principle for the general
regulation of behavior.198 Thus, under contractualism, an act is
morally right if and only if no one could reasonably reject a
general principle permitting the act.
When, according to contractualism, can a principle be
reasonably rejected? The concept underlying the notion of

195. Id.
196. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 180, at 390 n.8 (“What is basic to
contractualism as I understand it is the idea of justifiability to each person (on grounds that
he or she could not reasonably reject).”).
197. Id. at 197 (“To justify an action to others is to offer reasons supporting it and to
claim that they are sufficient to defeat any objections that others may have. To do this,
however, is also to defend a principle, namely one claiming that such reasons are sufficient
grounds for so acting under the prevailing conditions.”).
198. Id. at 197, 390 n.8.
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reasonable rejectability is the minimax criterion.199 Among a set
of candidate principles, the non-rejectable principle P is the one
of which the following is true: the strongest complaint any person
could make against P, were P generally accepted, is weaker than
the strongest complaint that could be made against every other
alternative principle.200 As Scanlon puts it, “[S]omeone can
reasonably reject a principle if there is some alternative to which
no other person has a complaint that is as strong.”201 The
principle no one could reasonably reject is the principle that,
among a set of candidate principles, minimizes the strength of the
complaint that could be lodged by the maximally burdened
person.202 Supposing I am the person that would be most
burdened by general acceptance of a particular principle, I still
cannot reasonably reject that principle if every alternative
principle would, if generally accepted, impose a greater burden
on someone else.
Contractualism thus contemplates a rejectability inquiry the
goal of which is to identify the principle or policy satisfying the
minimax criterion. This is a fundamentally comparative inquiry
that takes into account not just the extent to which general
acceptance of each candidate principle burdens each affected
person in an absolute sense, but also the differential each person
experiences in the burdens they would bear under the respective
principles.203 That is, supposing A is the most burdened party
under Principle P-1 and B the most burdened party under
Principle P-2, we ask not only if A’s burden under Principle P-1
is weightier than B’s burden under Principle P-2, but also if A’s
gain in moving from P-1 to P-2 is more significant than B’s gain
in moving from P-2 to P-1. The question to be asked, in other
199. I follow Sophia Reibetanz Moreau in using the minimax criterion to explain the
notion of reasonable rejectability. See Reibetanz, supra note 124, at 300 (describing a
“Minimax Complaint Model” of reasonable rejectability) (emphasis omitted).
200. See id.; see also Scanlon, Contracualism, supra note 180, at 111-12.
201. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 180, at 229; see also Scanlon,
Contractualism, supra note 180, at 111 (“[I]t would be unreasonable . . . to reject a principle
because it imposed a burden on you when every alternative principle would impose much
greater burdens on others.”).
202. Applying the minimax rule to complaints or burdens is roughly (though not
perfectly—see infra note 204 and accompanying text) equivalent to applying the more
familiar “maximin” rule to outcomes for individual well-being.
203. See Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 180, at 113; Reibetanz, supra note 124,
at 299.
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words, is whether it would be unreasonable for A to refuse to
accept the loss she would experience in moving from P-2 to P-1
in order that B can avoid the loss she would experience in moving
from P-1 to P-2.204
A critically important feature of contractualism—one that
makes it particularly appropriate as an interpretation of equity—
is what has been termed its individualist restriction, i.e., “the
insistence that the justifiability of a moral principle depends only
on various individuals’ reasons for objecting to that principle and
alternatives to it.”205
In other words, according to the
individualist restriction, the strength of a complaint lodged
against a particular principle can never be a function of the sum
of different individuals’ gain (or loss) in well-being under that
principle as compared with some alternative principle.206
Contractualism, in other words, does not allow for the
interpersonal aggregation of complaints.207 Contractualism
instead contemplates a series of “pairwise comparisons” in which
one representative individual’s burden under a particular
principle is compared to one other representative individual’s
burden under an alternative principle.208 Thus, in Policy Choice,
the fact that there are many more people in Group A than in Group
B plays no role in determining which policy is justifiable to each
person. That determination is made entirely on the basis of a
pairwise comparison between representative members of each
group.209
204. See Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 180, at 123. For example, suppose that
under P-1, A’s well-being is 102 and B’s 103 and that under P-2, A’s well-being is 150 and
B’s 101. The mere fact that the loser under P-1 (A) is slightly better off than the loser under
P-2 (B) does not necessarily mean that P-1 is the non-rejectable principle satisfying the
minimax criterion. This is because A might plausibly be taken to have a stronger complaint
with P-1 being chosen over P-2 than B would have with P-2 being chosen over P-1. Why?
Because it would arguably be unreasonable for B to refuse to accept a 2-unit (roughly 2%)
reduction in well-being in order that A can avoid a 48-unit (roughly 32%) reduction in wellbeing. Thus, B could not reasonably reject P-2.
205. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 180, at 229.
206. See Reibetanz, supra note 124, at 300.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. In cases involving the imposition of a risk of harm, as opposed to the imposition
of harm itself, contractualism requires a further specification. Are the possible policies or
courses of action to be evaluated on the basis of the risk of harm they pose to each person
they might impact (so-called “ex ante contractualism”) or on the basis of the actual harm
they cause to the person or persons they do impact (so-called “ex post contractualism”). For
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C. Equity Justifies Use of Willingness-to-Pay, But Not
a VSL
1. A Stylized Workplace Risk Scenario: Chromium (2)
Suppose the government is deciding whether to enact a
chromium regulation that will affect two and only two people, W
and C. W, the only worker employed in the industry in question,
is exposed to chromium in the course of her work. C is the
industry’s only consumer. Suppose that, prior to regulation,
chromium exposure poses a 1 in 50,000 mortality risk to W. The
risk can be reduced in half, to 1 in 100,000, at a cost of $40 to the
industry, which cost will be entirely passed on to C in the form of
a price increase. The risk can be entirely eliminated at a cost of
$240 to the industry, which cost will also be entirely passed on to
C. (Call this Chromium (2).) Suppose, as above, that the
government has determined that, although very few people would
be willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality
risk, the vast majority of people would be willing to pay $90 to
avoid a mortality risk of that magnitude. From the standpoint of
morality, which of the following three actions is appropriate: not
to regulate at all, to regulate so that the risk is reduced to 1 in
100,000 (moderate regulation), or to regulate so that the risk is
eliminated (aggressive regulation)? The following chart shows
the risk and cost burdens associated with each regulatory option.

reasons I have described elsewhere, I find ex ante contractualism to be the more plausible
and defensible form of contractualism in cases involving imposition of a risk of harm. See
Waisman, supra note 19, at 1291-95. A number of commentators have reached a similar
conclusion. See, e.g., Frick, supra note 42, at 180, 219; Aaron James, Contractualism’s (Not
So) Slippery Slope, 18 LEGAL THEORY 263, 274, 292, & n.7 (2012); Rahul Kumar, Risking
and Wronging, 43 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 27, 48 (2015).
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Regulatory
Action
No
regulation
Moderate
regulation
Aggressive
regulation

MORAL CONTEXT
Chromium (2)
Worker’s
Burden
1 in 50,000 risk
(WTP ≥$180210)
1 in 100,000 risk
(WTP = $90)
No risk
(WTP = $0)
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Consumer’s
Burden
$0
$40
$240

Notice first that the norm of personal autonomy is not
implicated here in the same way it is in the case of consumption
risks.211 Recall that in Arsenic (1), the risk-bearer’s autonomybased objection to the risk-reducing regulation rested on the fact
that the regulation’s costs and benefits would fall entirely on her
and her alone.212 For that reason, the risk-bearer’s rational
preference for assuming the risk, rather than paying the cost of
avoiding it, could not be overridden without disrespecting her
right to be sovereign in matters bearing exclusively on her own
interests.213 Absent a determination that the risk-bearer’s
preference was an irrational one, we saw that there did not seem
to be any normative basis for forcing A to invest more in her own
safety than she would wish to.214
By contrast, if the government decides to regulate in
Chromium (2), C may be forced to pay a cost she does not wish
to pay, but this would not involve forcing her to invest in her own
safety. In Chromium (2), by hypothesis, the costs of the
regulation fall on C, but the associated risk-reduction benefit
accrues to W. For this reason, were C to object to the regulation
on autonomy grounds, the objection could not be based on C’s
210. The assumption here is that, if W is willing to pay $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000
mortality risk, she would be willing to pay at least twice as much to avoid a 1 in 50,000
mortality risk. See supra note 36 (noting that willingness-to-pay increases nonlinearly with
the magnitude of the mortality risk avoided).
211. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 130 (noting that, in cases where risk-bearers do
not bear the costs of risk-reducing regulations, “it is much harder to argue that the use of
cost-benefit analysis promotes autonomy”).
212. See supra Part II.D.1.
213. Supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part II.D.1.
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right to be sovereign in matters affecting her own and only her
own interests. The regulatory decision here affects C’s interests,
but it also clearly affects W’s.
Of course, this does not mean that the norm of autonomy is
not implicated at all. C might argue that forcing her to make any
sort of investment in W’s safety would violate her autonomy,
because C might rationally prefer not to invest anything in
reducing the risk chromium exposure poses to W. However,
unlike the autonomy-based case against regulation in Arsenic (1),
the autonomy-based case against regulation in Chromium (2)
faces a powerful counterargument based on the norm of equity, a
norm which attends to the distribution of burdens and benefits
among distinct persons.215
This counterargument would begin by observing that C and
W both benefit in a direct and meaningful way from the existence
of the industry that, through its use of chromium, poses a risk of
premature death to W. C benefits from consuming the industry’s
product. W benefits from gainful employment in the industry’s
production process. Because C and W both derive significant
benefits from the industry’s existence, it is reasonable to ask them
both to bear a share of the burdens necessary to provide those
benefits. C’s burden takes the form of the monetary cost she must
pay to purchase and consume the industry’s product. W’s burden
takes the form of the risk she must bear to participate in the
industry’s production process. Notice that these burdens are
inversely proportional: because the industry will typically pass on
the costs of regulatory compliance to consumers, lessening the
mortality risk W faces will mean increasing the cost C must pay
for the industry’s product. Because W and C have a mutual
burden-sharing responsibility, the key question then becomes
how to equitably balance the burdens that C and W respectively
bear. Because C and W both benefit significantly from the
activity, equity arguably requires that, as far as possible, their
respective burdens be equalized.216
215. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1265-66.
216. If the net benefit W realizes from the activity is substantially greater than the net
benefit C realizes (or vice versa), equity would arguably require that a larger share of the
activity’s mortality risk burden be borne by the party that realizes the larger net benefit. The
analysis in this Part proceeds on the assumption that the net benefits realized by workers and
consumers are roughly equal. Where this is not the case and there is a significant disparity
in net benefit between worker and consumer, equity may require that a multiplier be used to
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With these observations as background, it is not difficult to
see why W would have a powerful equity-based argument for
choosing moderate regulation over no regulation. Assume that W
and C are identical with respect to their preexisting levels of
wealth and their willingness to pay for reductions in mortality
risk.217 Assume further that W and C would both be willing to
pay $90 for a 1 in 100,000 reduction in mortality risk. Finally,
assume W and C would both suffer the identical reduction in wellbeing as the result of bearing a given monetary cost or a given
mortality risk. A decision not to regulate at all, rather than to
regulate moderately, would mean denying W a safety benefit
worth $90 (to both W and C) for the sake of sparing C from a $40
cost. From the standpoint of contractualism, the question is
whether C could reasonably reject a principle requiring her to pay
$40 to spare W from a risk imposition that both C and W would,
by hypothesis, be willing to pay $90 to avoid. Put in terms of
welfare rather than dollars, could C reasonably reject a principle
requiring her to bear the welfare loss associated with paying a $40
cost in order to spare W from experiencing the presumably larger
welfare loss associated with a risk imposition that is equivalent to
paying a $90 cost?218
It seems that she could not. As between no regulation and
moderate regulation, moderate regulation is the course of action
that satisfies contractualism’s minimax requirement. As the chart
adjust the burden of risk regulation accordingly. For example, if, on average, each worker’s
net benefit from the activity were twice as large as each consumer’s, it would arguably be
inequitable to require a consumer to bear any regulatory cost c unless the associated
reduction in each worker’s mortality risk were one for which the worker would be willing to
pay 2c or more. In Chromium (2), the moderate regulation, which imposes a $40 cost on the
consumer, would satisfy this test because the safety benefit it provides, a 1 in 100,000
reduction in the worker’s mortality risk, is one for which the worker would, by hypothesis,
be willing to pay $90, which is more than twice the amount of its $40 cost.
217. These are, of course, unrealistic assumptions. I make them here just for purposes
of stating the equity-based arguments in the simplest and clearest way possible. I later
consider how differences in preexisting wealth levels and risk aversion would complicate the
argument. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
218. When asking this question, it is critical to bear in mind that C is not simply being
asked to pay $40 to reduce a mortality risk to someone else. Rather, C is being asked to pay
$40 to mitigate the mortality risk burden that an activity from which C benefits places on
someone else. Although C is not herself imposing a mortality risk on W, the risk is imposed
as a necessary incident of an industrial activity that provides a significant benefit to C. For
that reason, as we saw above, it is reasonable to ask C to bear a share of the cost of reducing
the risk to W.

272

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:1

above illustrates, under either no regulation or moderate
regulation, W is the most burdened party. If no regulation is
enacted, W bears a 1 in 50,000 mortality risk (which she would
be willing to pay at least $180 to avoid) and C experiences no
increase in the cost of the product. If the government opts for
moderate regulation, W bears a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk (which
she would be willing to pay $90 to avoid), and C experiences a
$40 increase in the product’s cost. W is therefore the most
burdened party under either regulatory scenario, but her burden is
obviously lighter under moderate regulation. From the standpoint
of the absolute level of the affected parties’ burdens, the minimax
criterion therefore favors moderate regulation. The minimax
criterion also favors moderate regulation from a comparative
standpoint. Compared to no regulation, moderate regulation
delivers to W a risk-reduction benefit worth at least $90, while
imposing on C a monetary cost of just $40. C could not
reasonably refuse to put up with the $40 cost of moderate
regulation in order that W can enjoy the $90 safety benefit that
she would miss out on were the government to decide not to
regulate at all.219 For these reasons, contractualism would hold
that W could reasonably reject a principle allowing for no
regulation of chromium exposure at all, whereas C could not
reasonably reject a principle allowing moderate regulation.
Taking contractualism as an interpretation of equity, this means
that it would be inequitable for the government to choose no
regulation over moderate regulation. In other words, a decision
not to regulate chromium exposure at all, rather than to regulate
moderately, would mean asking W to bear more than her fair
share of the burden of the industrial activity that benefits both C
and W in a meaningful way.
If equity favors moderate regulation over no regulation in
Chromium (2), it also favors moderate regulation over aggressive
regulation. Regulating aggressively would reduce W’s mortality
risk by 1 in 50,000 at a cost of $240 to C. Compared with
moderate regulation, aggressive regulation would reduce W’s
mortality risk by an additional 1 in 100,000 at an incremental cost
219. Cf. Scanlon, Contractualism, supra note 180, at 123 (“The question to be asked
is, is it unreasonable for someone to refuse to put up with the Losers’ situation under [one
principle] in order that someone else should be able to enjoy the benefits which he would
have to give up under [an alternative principle]?”).
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of $200 to C. Could C reasonably reject a principle requiring her
to pay an additional $200 to provide W with an additional riskreduction benefit for which W herself would be willing to pay no
more than $90? In other words, could C reasonably refuse to
accept the welfare loss associated with paying a $200 cost so that
W can avoid the smaller welfare loss associated with a risk
imposition that is equivalent to paying a $90 cost?
It seems that she could. As between moderate regulation and
aggressive regulation, moderate regulation is the course of action
that satisfies the minimax criterion. Although W is the most
burdened party under moderate regulation, C is the most burdened
party under aggressive regulation. W’s burden under moderate
regulation is a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk, while C’s burden under
aggressive regulation is a cost of $240. Since, by hypothesis, C
and W would be willing to pay no more than $90 to avoid a 1 in
100,000 mortality risk, C’s monetary burden under aggressive
regulation is arguably weightier than W’s mortality risk burden
under moderate regulation. Thus, from an absolute standpoint,
moderate regulation would seem to be the course of action that
minimizes the extent of the burden borne by the maximally
burdened party. The same is true from a comparative standpoint.
Compared to moderate regulation, aggressive regulation lowers
W’s mortality risk by 1 in 100,000 while increasing C’s monetary
burden by $200. In other words, aggressive regulation would
mean imposing an incremental burden of $200 on C for the sake
of providing an incremental risk reduction benefit of $90 to W.
To do so would be inequitable. C could reasonably refuse to
accept a $200 cost for the sake of delivering a risk reduction
benefit worth just $90 to W. To ask C to accept this burden would
be to ask her to invest more in W’s safety than W herself would
have been willing to invest in her own safety. If W herself would
not have been willing to pay more than $90 to avoid a 1in 100,000
mortality risk, it seems unreasonable to ask C to pay $200—over
twice as much—to provide W with a risk reduction of that
magnitude.
Thus, adopting ex ante contractualism as an interpretation of
equity, the most equitable course of action in Chromium (2) is for
the government to regulate moderately, reducing W’s risk of
death from chromium exposure from 1 in 50,000 to 1 in 100,000
at a cost of $40 to C. Neither W nor C could reasonably reject a
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principle allowing for moderate regulation because both of the
other regulatory alternatives—no regulation and aggressive
regulation—involve imposing a greater burden on some party (W
and C, respectively) than moderate regulation imposes on the
party it burdens most heavily (W). This is just what it means to
say that, among all three regulatory alternatives, moderate
regulation is the alternative that satisfies the minimax criterion.
Recall that C might object to regulation in Chromium (2) on
autonomy grounds.220 A decision to regulate moderately or
aggressively would arguably violate C’s autonomy by requiring
her to pay a cost she may not wish to pay. It is now clear that this
objection could be met forcefully on the basis of equity. If C
wishes to avail herself of the benefits of the chromium-using
industry, she can reasonably be expected to bear an equitable
share of the associated burden. She is not being forced to
purchase the good or service offered by the chromium-using
industry. Once she chooses to do so, she can reasonably be asked
to bear her fair share of the burden the industry imposes on
society.
Contractualism’s minimax criterion represents a
plausible specification of what each party’s equitable share of the
industry’s mortality risk burden would be. Any violation of C’s
autonomy resulting from adherence to the minimax criterion in
setting the appropriate level of regulation would therefore seem
to be justifiable on the basis of equity. Thus, from the standpoint
of normative pluralism, moderate regulation would seem to be the
right course of action, all things considered.
What general point or principle does this analysis of
Chromium (2) establish? The most fundamental point is that the
norm of equity requires that individuals’ willingness-to-pay to
avoid small mortality risks—the current basis of the VSL—serve
as a guide for the regulation of workplace risks, just as the norm
of personal autonomy requires that willingness-to-pay serve as a
guide for the regulation of consumption risks.221 This general
point can be formulated as a principle that I have elsewhere
dubbed the individual risk principle: when it comes to workplace
risks, equity requires that each cost-bearing consumer make all
and only those investments in risk-reduction that each risk-

220. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
221. See Waisman, supra note 23, at 676-79.
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bearing worker would have been willing to make on her own
behalf.222 As noted above, this principle rests on the premise that,
because worker and consumer both benefit meaningfully from the
industrial activity that gives rise to the risk, it is fair to ask both to
bear a fair share of the activity’s mortality risk burden.223
According to the individual risk principle, the way to accomplish
an equitable distribution of this burden is to require each
consumer to invest in reducing each worker’s mortality risk up to
the point at which the worker herself would cease investing were
she to bear each consumer’s share of the regulatory costs.224
The individual risk principle must be qualified in three
important ways, however. First, as formulated above, the
individual risk principle assumes that (1) the worker and
consumer both would suffer the identical reduction in welfare as
the result of the imposition of a given monetary cost or a given
mortality risk (2) the worker and consumer have the identical
willingness to pay to avoid mortality risks of varying magnitudes
(e.g., they would both be willing to pay no more than $90 to avoid
a mortality risk of 1 in 100,000).225 In the real world, these
assumptions are unlikely to hold true. Levels of preexisting
wealth and income may vary significantly among those
individuals likely to be affected by a given workplace risk
regulation.226 Such differences are likely to affect the amount
individuals are willing to pay to avoid a given mortality risk. This
follows from the general point that willingness-to-pay is a
function of ability-to-pay.227 Moreover, disparities in preexisting levels of wealth or income may impact the extent of the
welfare loss individuals experience as the result of the imposition
of a given monetary cost. A $200 cost will almost certainly have

222. See id. (describing the individual risk principle).
223. Id. at 677.
224. See id. (noting that individual risk principle represents a “single-owner” approach
to risk regulation); cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76
B.U. L. REV. 273, 282 (1996) (describing a “‘single-owner’ conception” of cost-benefit
analysis “which asks what the actor . . . would do if he owned all the resources in question
and would therefore internalize all the costs and benefits of the decision”).
225. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text; see also Waisman, supra note
23, at 676.
226. See Waisman, supra note 23, at 679.
227. See Mark S. Thompson, Willingness to Pay and Accept Risks to Cure Chronic
Disease, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 392 (1986).

276

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:1

a greater effect on the well-being of a very poor person than on
that of a very rich person.
For example, suppose W in Chromium (2) is quite poor,
while C is quite wealthy. Even assuming W and C have identical
degrees of aversion to risks of premature death, W would
plausibly be willing to pay significantly less to avoid a mortality
risk of 1 in 100,000 than C would. Suppose that, while C would
be willing to pay $90 to avoid a risk of that magnitude, W would
only be willing to pay $30. Should this give C a sound equitybased objection to moderate regulation, which would require her
to invest $10 more in W’s safety that W herself would have been
willing to invest in her own safety, thereby violating the
individual risk principle? Plausibly not. It is very possible that,
while the imposition of a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk would reduce
both W and C’s welfare by the same amount, C would be willing
to pay significantly more to avoid a risk of that magnitude due
solely to her greater ability-to-pay to avoid mortality risks
generally. In other words, it is quite possible that, if W had C’s
greater ability-to-pay, W would be willing to pay $90, rather than
just $30, to avoid the mortality risk to which she is subject. If that
were true, it would be inequitable to W to allow C to escape the
cost of moderate regulation due solely to W’s lesser ability-topay. Because the setback to W’s welfare due to the 1 in 100,000
mortality risk would be greater than the setback to C’s welfare
due to the $40 cost of eliminating that risk, the equitable course
of action is moderate regulation.
What this shows is that, in applying considerations of equity
to mortality risk regulation, the weight of the burdens that
differently situated individuals are determined to bear should
really be a function of the individuals’ welfare or welfare-related
interests. Willingness-to-pay is just a proxy for welfare. As Cass
Sunstein has noted, “Because welfare is the master concept, and
because monetized numbers are mere proxies, it would seem clear
that the proxies would have to yield in favor of the master
concept.”228 The individual risk principle might, then, be
reformulated as follows in terms of welfare rather than
willingness-to-pay: in the case of workplace risks, equity requires
that each cost-bearing consumer invest in risk-reducing
228. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 129.
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regulation up to the point at which further investment would
reduce the well-being of each consumer by more than it would
increase the well-being of each risk-bearing worker.
Equivalently, equity requires that each cost-bearing consumer
make all, and only those, risk-reducing investments in worker
safety that a worker would have been willing to make in her own
safety, were the worker in the economic situation of the costbearer.229
The second qualification of the individual risk principle is
that it must be defeasible in circumstances where it would
prescribe a level of regulatory investment so great as to threaten
to bankrupt the regulated industry, assuming the industry’s
existence is normatively desirable.230 For example, suppose the
$40 price increase associated with enacting the moderate
regulation in Chromium (2) were enough to dissuade C from
purchasing the industry’s good or service altogether. This
reduction in consumer demand could make the industry
unprofitable and thereby drive it out of business. If the total social
benefit the industry delivers exceeds the total cost it imposes on
society,231 bankrupting the industry might be a normatively
undesirable result. In such circumstances, capping regulatory
investment below the level dictated by the individual risk
principle—and thereby preserving the industry—could therefore
be defended on the basis of the norms of welfare maximization,
equity, or both.
The final qualification relates to normative pluralism. The
individual risk principle is meant to represent a specification of
what the norm of equity (interpreted as ex ante contractualism)
requires in circumstances of the typical workplace risk, i.e.,
circumstances in which risk-bearers do not bear the costs of riskreducing regulations, but both risk-bearers and cost-bearers
benefit meaningfully from the industrial activity that gives rise to

229. See Waisman, supra note 23, at 677.
230. See id. at 681 (noting that regulatory costs should be capped “short of the level
required by the individual risk principle if this is necessary to preserve the underlying
socially beneficial activity”); Waisman, supra note 19, at 1316-31 (same).
231. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1317-20 (describing the notion of all-thingsconsidered beneficialness, i.e., whether the industry in question is socially beneficial taking
into account considerations of overall well-being, equity, and other relevant normative
factors).
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the risk.232 Equity is just one of the several norms that may be
applicable in such circumstances, and normative pluralism makes
room for the possibility that, in some cases, the equitable course
of action may not be the morally right course of action all things
considered.233 Thus, there may be circumstances in which the
individual risk principle would dictate a course of action that turns
out, on a complete normative analysis, to be wrong. For example,
suppose a 1 in 1,000 mortality risk to 1,000 workers can be
eliminated by enacting a regulation costing $5 billion, the cost of
which would be spread equally among 1 million consumers for a
per-capita cost of $5,000. The individual risk principle would
require enacting the regulation, since, taking $9 million as a VSL,
each worker would be willing to spend up to $9,000 to avoid the
mortality risk to which they are subject, a figure substantially in
excess of the $5,000 each consumer would have to pay were the
regulation enacted. However, in such circumstances, a very
powerful argument against regulation could be made based on the
norm of welfare maximization. Imposing a $5 billion cost on 1
million people by requiring each person to pay $5,000—which
represents a significant expense for most people—would
arguably lower overall well-being by significantly more than the
combination of a single expected death and the imposition of a
1in 1,000 mortality risk on 1,000 people would. For this reason,
welfare maximization considerations might plausibly trump
equitable considerations in this instance, making it morally
impermissible to enact the regulation. This example is offered to
underscore that the individual risk principle merely specifies the
requirements of equity as part of a broader, normatively
pluralistic theoretical framework. The individual risk principle is
not here claimed to be a regulatory principle that ought to be
adhered to in every instance.
2. A More Realistic Scenario: Chromium (200,000)
The next question is whether the equity-based case for
moderate regulation in Chromium (2) loses any of its force when
we move to a more realistic workplace risk scenario in which
chromium poses a 1 in 50,000 mortality risk to 100,000 workers
232. See Waisman, supra note 23, at 677.
233. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1303.
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in a given industry, with the costs of regulation spread among
100,000 industry consumers in the form of a $40-per-capita price
increase (for the moderate regulation) and a $240-per-capita price
increase (for the aggressive regulation). (Call this Chromium
(200,000).) The chart below illustrates the individual and
aggregate burdens associated with each regulatory option. Notice
that, because of the much larger number of risk-bearers involved,
a choice to regulate in Chromium (200,000) carries the expected
benefit of saving actual lives (one life in the case of moderate
regulation, two in the case of aggressive regulation).
Chromium (200,000)

Regulatory
Action

No
regulation

Moderate
regulation
Aggressive
regulation

Each
Worker’s
Ex Ante
Burden
1 in 50,000
risk
(WTP
≥$180)
1 in 100,000
risk
(WTP =
$90)
No risk
(WTP = $0)

Each
Consumer’s
Burden

Ex Post
Burden
on
100,000
Workers

Total
Burden on
100,000
Consumers

$0

2
expected
deaths

$0

$40

1
expected
death

$4 million

$240

0
expected
deaths

$24
million

In Chromium (2), we saw that equity, interpreted as ex ante
contractualism, decisively favored moderate regulation over no
regulation.234 In Chromium (200,000), the equity case for
moderate regulation is arguably even stronger, because a decision
not to regulate in Chromium (200,000) would mean treating not
just one but 100,000 workers inequitably.235 Moreover, in
234. See Part III.C.1.
235. Cf. supra Part II.D.2 (making similar point about the autonomy-based case
against regulation in Arsenic (100,000), which would involve 100,000 instances of the
autonomy violation involved in Arsenic (1)).
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addition to equity, welfare maximization arguably provides an
independent normative basis for moderate regulation in
Chromium (200,000).236 Choosing not to regulate would
arguably deliver a greater setback to overall well-being than
moderate regulation would.237 That is because the imposition of
a $40 cost on each of 100,000 people would plausibly decrease
overall well-being by less than the combination of one (expected)
death and the imposition of an additional 1 in 100,000 mortality
risk on 100,000 people would. Thus, in Chromium (200,000),
both equity and welfare maximization arguably favor moderate
regulation over no regulation.
The more interesting question is whether the case for
aggressive regulation is stronger in Chromium (200,000) than in
Chromium (2). After all, regulating aggressively instead of
moderately in Chromium (200,000) would mean saving one
additional life.238 For this reason, welfare maximization might
well favor aggressive over moderate regulation. As we saw in
connection with Arsenic (100,000), the imposition of a $200 cost
on each of 100,000 people would arguably decrease overall wellbeing by less than the combination of one (expected) death and
the imposition of an additional 1 in 100,000 mortality risk on
100,000 people would.239 If this is so, the case for choosing to
regulate moderately rather than aggressively in Chromium
(200,000) would have to rest entirely on equity, just as the case
against regulation in Arsenic (100,000) rested entirely on personal
autonomy. Is the equity-based case for moderate regulation in
Chromium (200,000) strong enough to overcome the arguable
welfare maximization case in favor of life-saving aggressive
regulation?
In Arsenic (100,000), the case against regulation rested on
the fact that saving the life of the unlucky consumer killed by
arsenic would have necessitated violating that consumer’s
autonomy ex ante.240 Because a decision not to regulate was in
the ex ante interest of each of the 100,000 cost-paying consumers,
a choice to regulate would have meant forcing 100,000 people to
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See supra tbl. Chromium (200,000).
See supra tbl. Chromium (200,000).
See supra tbl. Chromium (200,000).
See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part II.D.2.
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make an investment in their own safety that none of them would
rationally have been willing to make.241 To the family of the
unlucky consumer killed as the result of a decision not to regulate,
that decision could be justified by pointing out that saving their
loved one’s life would have required violating their loved one’s
autonomy ex ante.242
What makes aggressive regulation in Chromium (200,000)
different is that the risk at issue is a workplace risk, not a
consumption risk. The costs of regulation are borne by
consumers who are not exposed to the risk at issue, rather than by
the risk-exposed workers who benefit from risk-reducing
regulations.243 Thus, unlike the decision not to regulate in Arsenic
(100,000), the decision to regulate moderately rather than
aggressively in Chromium (200,000) cannot be justified on
grounds of personal autonomy. To the family of the unlucky
worker killed when the mortality risk tolerated under moderate
regulation materializes, one could not justify moderate regulation
by pointing out that saving their loved one’s life would have
meant forcing her to invest more in her own safety than she would
rationally have wished to. Moreover, unlike the choice not to
regulate in Arsenic (100,000), a choice to regulate moderately in
Chromium (200,000) does not work to the ex ante advantage of
the person unlucky enough to lose their life as the result of that
choice.244 Whereas opting not to regulate in Arsenic (100,000)
spares each risk-bearing consumer from a $200 cost, opting for
moderate rather than aggressive regulation in Chromium
(200,000) provides no such monetary benefit to the risk-bearing
workers.245
In arguing that the government should have chosen to
regulate aggressively, the unlucky worker’s family might
therefore draw an analogy between Chromium (200,000) and the
case of the Trapped Miner, discussed in Part II. Arguably, if it
would be unreasonable for the 100,000 town residents to refuse
to pay $200 each to save the trapped miner’s life, then it would
be similarly unreasonable for the 100,000 consumers in
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part III.C.2.
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Chromium (200,000) to refuse to each accept a $200 price
increase to save the life of a worker. Both scenarios involve a
group of 100,000 people being asked to pay $200 each to save the
life of a person who is not among the 100,000 would-be costbearers (which is what makes both scenarios relevantly different
from Arsenic (100,000)). In both cases, it would arguably be
inequitable to allow the death of one person to occur simply to
spare each of 100,000 people from having to pay a cost of $200.
Thus, the family might argue that the equitable course of action
in Chromium (200,000) is aggressive regulation.
This analogy between Trapped Miner and Chromium
(200,000) rests on an implicit equivalence between identified and
statistical lives. The implicit claim is that there is no morally
relevant difference between an action that will avoid a death
otherwise certain to befall an identifiable person, and an action
that will avoid a death otherwise statistically expected to befall an
ex ante unidentifiable person.246 Is this claim defensible? Does
it make any difference, from a moral point of view, that each of
the 100,000 cost-bearers in Trapped Miner is being asked to pay
$200 each to avoid certain death for a person who is, at the time
of the request, identifiable, whereas each of the 100,000 costbearers in Chromium (200,000) is being asked to pay $200 each
to avoid the expected death of a person who is unidentifiable at
that time?
One possible reason it might make a difference is that a death
that is statistically expected to occur is not certain to occur. As
we saw above, when a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk is imposed on
100,000 people, there is a substantial chance—roughly 36.8%—
that no death will occur.247 It might plausibly be argued that the
moral obligation to avoid a certain death is greater than the moral
obligation to avoid a death that has only a 63.2% chance of
occurring. However, this distinction is rather unsatisfying
because many mortality risks are practically certain to result in
the death of at least one person. For example, when a 1 in 10,000
risk of death is imposed on 100,000 people, 10 deaths are
statistically expected, but the chance of at least one death
occurring is extremely high: 99.99996% (1 - .9999100,000). If
246. On the difference between identified and statistical lives, see sources cited supra
note 42. See also Frick, supra note 42, at 212 n.41.
247. See supra notes 94-95.
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Chromium (200,000) were modified so that aggressive regulation
would involve the elimination of a 1 in 10,000 mortality risk to
100,000 workers, it begins to look very similar to Trapped Miner
with respect to the certainty that the regulatory action will avoid
at least one death. Many mortality risks that are the subject of
government regulation are similar in this respect—they are
statistically expected to result in multiple deaths and practically
certain to result in at least one death.248
Suppose then, for the sake of argument, we assume that the
aggressive regulation in Chromium (200,000) were certain to
result in the saving of a life that would otherwise have been lost
due to the chromium exposure tolerated under moderate
regulation. With this assumption in place, does it remain a
morally relevant difference that the identity of the person whose
life is to be saved in Trapped Miner is known at the time of the
decision, whereas the identity of the person whose life is to be
saved in Chromium (200,000) is not?
From one standpoint, it seems irrelevant whether this
particular piece of information—the identity of the person whose
life will be saved by the action under consideration—is known at
the time of the decision. If we know for certain that the action
under consideration will save someone’s life, what does it matter
whether we know that person’s name, age, gender, ethnicity,
religion, or other identifying characteristics?249
However, there is another difference between Trapped
Miner and Chromium (200,000) which does seem relevant. The
difference relates to the fact that, at the time the payment decision
is to be made in Trapper Miner, there is at least one way of
identifying the individual whose life will be lost absent action
being taken: one can say, “It is the person trapped at the bottom
of this mine.” One could pick out the person in this way even if
248. See Lisa A. Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk
Reductions, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 283, 283-85 (2007) (explaining how government
agencies calculate risks and create regulations). These risks are based on deaths statistically
expected but, as demonstrated above, the likelihood that at least one death will occur is
extremely high, 99.99996%.
249. See Reibetanz, supra note 124, at 304 (“[W]henever we know that someone will
be harmed or benefited in a certain way, we should assign him a complaint based upon the
full magnitude of that harm or benefit. It is irrelevant, for moral purposes, whether we can
identify the bearer of this complaint in advance.”); see also Frick, supra note 42, at 184
(discussing argument that “the identity of the eventual victims is irrelevant information”).
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one knew none of his or her identifying characteristics (other than
being a live human being). By contrast, at the time the regulatory
decision is to be made in Chromium (200,000), there is absolutely
no way of identifying or picking out the unlucky worker whose
life will be lost if the government opts for moderate rather than
aggressive regulation. At that time, all it is possible to say is that
the unlucky worker, whoever she may turn out to be, is presently
among a group of 100,000 workers, each of whom faces a 1 in
100,000 risk of premature death if chromium is regulated
moderately.
This difference matters from the standpoint of equity. When
one decides whether equity requires me to assume a burden in
order to provide a benefit to you, one relevant question may be
whether you would have been willing to assume that burden in
order to provide the identical benefit to yourself.250 Call this the
single-person test, as it involves imagining that the burden and
benefit in question would both be experienced by a single person.
The question is, had you been faced with the choice whether to
assume a particular burden in order to provide yourself with a
corresponding benefit, would you have been willing to assume
that burden? If so, then equity may require that I assume that
burden for your benefit. Contractualism’s minimax criterion,
which is embodied in the individual risk principle, represents a
more-or-less straightforward application of this single person
inquiry.251
Of course, the answer to the single-person test need not be
dispositive of the question of whether equity requires me to
assume a burden for your benefit. In many circumstances, it
seems that I could equitably reject bearing a burden that you
would have been willing to assume for your own benefit.
Certainly, your willingness to pay a large sum of your own money
for the benefit of owning a new car does not mean I would be
acting inequitably by refusing to pay the same sum of my money
to buy the car for you. And one can imagine circumstances in
which equity would require me to assume a greater burden for
your benefit than you yourself would have been willing to
250. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1284-85 (demonstrating equity requires an
examination of the benefits and burdens to different individuals).
251. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text (illustrating minimax criterion
as one that requires a principle be accepted if other persons would accept it).
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assume. If I negligently run you over with my car and cause you
serious injuries, treating you equitably may require that I provide
you with more expensive medical care than you would have been
willing to provide for yourself, even assuming you and I have
identical levels of pre-existing wealth.
But there are circumstances in which the single-person test
does seem to provide a very good gauge of what equity requires.
As noted above, when two people (or two groups of people) both
derive meaningful and roughly equal benefit from an activity that
imposes a significant burden on either or both of them, equity
arguably requires that the burdens be, as far as possible, equally
distributed between them.252 As discussed, the typical workplace
risk is a good example of such circumstances. In such
circumstances, the single-person test can be useful in determining
what an equitable distribution of the burden would look like.253
The single-person test raises an epistemic issue, however.
What information should be assumed to be available to the
hypothetical person when she makes the decision whether to
assume the burden in question for her own benefit? One plausible
answer is that the person should be assumed to know all and only
the information that was knowable at the time the decision had to
be made. This is, after all, the epistemic constraint on decisions
made in real life.254 The single-person test could then be
reformulated in the following way: how would the person have
acted on their own behalf at the time of the decision, knowing all
and only what was knowable at that time? In other words,
knowing everything relevant and knowable at the time of the
decision, would you have been willing to assume the burden in
question for your own benefit?
Formulating the single-person test in this way allows us to
understand why, for purposes of equity, Trapped Miner is
importantly different from Chromium (200,000). In Trapped
Miner, at the time the payment decision is to be made, there is
252. See supra note 216 and preceding text.
253. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (providing an example of typical
workplace risk); see also supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text (showing single person
test requires a balancing of the burdens to determine what is equitable).
254. See generally Hugh Courtney et al., Deciding How to Decide, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Nov. 2013, https://hbr.org/2013/11/deciding-how-to-decide [https://perma.cc/ J4KR-L6V6]
(examining process of decision making and how persons are limited by information known
at the time).
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information available to all persons—including the potential
victim—about who it is that will die should the town residents
choose not to pay the $200-per-capita cost of the rescue: the
person presently trapped at the bottom of the mine. Thus, were
the town residents to apply the single-person test at the time their
payment decision was to be made, the emphatic answer would be
affirmative: knowing all and only what was knowable at that time,
the would-be beneficiary of the payment decision (the trapped
miner) would undoubtedly have been willing to assume the
burden of paying $200 in order to receive the benefit of avoiding
certain premature death. Were the town residents to choose not
to assume that burden, they would do so in the knowledge that, at
the very time they made that choice, there was a person who,
based on all and only the information available at that time, would
have been willing to assume that burden on her own behalf. For
that reason, equity would arguably require that each town resident
make a $200 payment to save the miner’s life.255
By contrast, at the time of the regulatory decision at issue in
Chromium (200,000), no would-be beneficiary of a decision to
regulate aggressively rather than moderately would, knowing all
and only what was knowable at that time, have been willing to
assume a $200 burden in order to receive the corresponding
benefit of eliminating a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk. This is
precisely what Arsenic (100,000) established: if the most that any
of 100,000 risk-bearers would be willing to pay to avoid a 1 in
100,000 mortality risk is $90, then each risk-bearer would
presumably choose to assume a risk of that magnitude rather than
pay a cost of $200.256 Assuming the same were true of the
100,000 workers in Chromium (200,000), then requiring each of
100,000 cost-bearing consumers to pay $200 to eliminate a 1 in
100,000 risk of death to those workers would mean requiring each
consumer to make an investment in the workers’ safety that,
knowing all and only what was knowable at the time the
investment decision had to be made, no worker would have been
willing to make in her own safety. When I complain that you
255. This assumes that Trapped Miner is similar to the typical workplace risk scenario
in that both the cost-bearers and the person in danger benefit meaningfully from the activity
that gave rise to the risk. In Trapped Miner, the risky activity is the operation of the town
mine, which could be presumed to provide jobs or other benefits to town residents.
256. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
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treated me inequitably by failing to assume a burden for the sake
of providing me with a benefit, it seems morally relevant whether
you would have been willing to assume the burden on your own
behalf. If, knowing all and only what was knowable at the time
the decision had to be made, you would not have been willing to
assume the burden on your own behalf, this would seem to be at
least prima facie grounds for believing that I would not be treating
you inequitably by refusing to assume the burden on your behalf.
Thus, to the family of the unlucky worker killed when the
chromium risk tolerated by moderate regulation materializes, one
could justify the risk imposition by saying, “Based on what was
known at the time, your loved one herself would not have been
willing to invest in her own safety what each cost-bearer would
have had to invest in order to prevent her death. Therefore, you
cannot reasonably expect each cost-bearer to have made that
investment on your loved one’s behalf.” And this is precisely
what could not be said to the family of the unlucky miner in
Trapped Miner. Thus, although equity requires saving the
trapped miner, it arguably requires moderate, rather than
aggressive, regulation in Chromium (200,000).
Another way of putting this point is as follows. Equity
weighs against aggressive regulation in Chromium (200,000)
because the position each worker is put in by virtue of being
exposed to a moderately regulated mortality risk is precisely the
position the worker would have put herself in had all the burdens
and benefits associated with the relevant decisions—whether to
be exposed to the risk at all and how much to spend to reduce the
risk—fallen on her.257 The worker would have chosen to be
exposed to the mortality risk associated with chromium because
this was the necessary cost of receiving the compensating benefit
of gainful employment.258 Further, for the reasons discussed
above in connection with Chromium (2), were both the burdens
and benefits of risk-regulation to accrue to the worker, she would
257. See discussion supra Part III.D.2 (showing aggressive regulation is not favorable
because the cost of the regulation is not justified by the risk).
258. Obviously, the worker would prefer employment with no mortality risk, but the
assumption here is that the worker’s decision to accept employment involving chromium
exposure is a rational one, both because the benefit the worker receives from such
employment exceeds the loss she experiences by virtue of the associated mortality risk and
because the net benefit she realizes from such employment exceeds the net benefit she would
realize from any other available employment.
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have chosen moderate regulation, rather than no regulation or
aggressive regulation.259 Thus, for a worker to expect consumers
to bear the additional $20 million cost of aggressive regulation is,
simply by virtue of the fact that the costs of risk-reducing
regulation happen to fall on someone else, to expect to be placed
in a better position than that in which the worker would have
placed herself. To do so would be to unfairly exploit a morally
arbitrary feature of workplace risks: that those subject to the risk
happen not to bear the costs of regulations that reduce it.
Thus, opting for aggressive rather than moderate regulation
in Chromium (200,000) would be inequitable to each of the
100,000 consumers for precisely the same reasons that it would
be inequitable to C in Chromium (2). The fact that the expected
cost of opting for moderate over aggressive regulation is greater
in Chromium (200,000)—one death, rather than a 1 in 100,000
risk of one death–may strengthen the welfare maximization case
for aggressive regulation, but it does not seem to weaken the
equity-based case against such regulation.260 This suggests that
application of the individual risk principle—which embodies both
the single person question and contractualism’s minimax
requirement—achieves equity not only in the stylized two-person
case of Chromium (2), but also in the more realistic sort of
workplace risk scenario presented in Chromium (200,000).261
Where a workplace risk falls on a large number of risk-bearers
and thereby stands to result in one or more statistical deaths,
equity requires that each cost-bearer be made to invest in riskreduction up to the point at which further investment would
reduce each cost-bearer’s well-being by more than it would
increase the expected well-being of each risk-bearer.262 To allow
regulatory investment to stop short of that point would be
inequitable to the risk-bearer. To expect regulatory investment
beyond that point would be inequitable to the cost-bearer.
The above analysis establishes that, when it comes to
workplace risks, equity provides the normative basis for using

259. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 193 & 257 and accompanying text.
261. Of course, the same three caveats to the individual risk principle discussed above
in connection with Chromium (2) apply here as well. See supra text immediately following
note 224.
262. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1266.
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willingness-to-pay as a guide for risk regulation. Of course, one
might still think, in a case like Chromium (200,000), the norm of
welfare maximization trumps the norm of equity, requiring
regulatory investment beyond the level dictated by the individual
risk principle. Even if this were so, the fundamental point made
above would still stand: to the extent willingness-to-pay is used
as a guide for the regulation of workplace mortality risks, the
basis for doing so is the norm of equity, interpreted as ex ante
contractualism.
If one uses willingness-to-pay data as a basis for workplace
risk regulation, the data must be employed in the way the
individual risk principle contemplates: to inform a comparison
between the amount each risk-bearer would be willing to pay for
a given reduction in their mortality risk and the amount each costbearer would actually have to pay to accomplish that reduction.263
This comparison relies directly on the individual willingness-topay data underlying the VSL (e.g., an average person would be
willing to pay $90 to avoid a 1 in 100,000 mortality risk), rather
than on the collective willingness-to-pay calculation the VSL
itself reflects (e.g., $9 million is the amount that 100,000 people
would collectively be willing to pay to avoid a 1 in 100,000
mortality risk).264 This suggests that, when it comes to workplace
risks, CBA must be modified in an important way. The next
section explains how.
3. Another Realistic Scenario: Chromium (1.1 million)
Like the decision to regulate in Arsenic (100,000), the
decision to regulate aggressively rather than moderately in
Chromium (200,000) would not be cost-justified based on a VSL
of $9 million. Both decisions would involve imposing a $20
million regulatory cost for the sake of realizing a benefit worth
only $9 million (saving one statistical life). When a regulation is
determined not to be cost-justified by the lights of CBA
employing a VSL that is calculated based on willingness-to-pay,
what is the normative significance of that determination? The
answer is: it depends on the moral context.

263. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
264. See supra Part I.A (describing how the VSL is calculated).
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Where those exposed to a mortality risk bear all or
substantially all of the costs of regulation (as is true in the case of
the typical consumption risk), a determination that a regulation is
not cost-justified provides good grounds for believing that
enacting the regulation would mean violating the personal
autonomy of each risk-bearer.265 To say a regulation is not costjustified is to say the total cost exceeds the total amount riskbearers would collectively be willing to pay for the risk reduction
the regulation accomplishes.266 If that is true, and if regulatory
costs are equally distributed among the same people who are
exposed to the risk, enacting a regulation that is not cost-justified
(such as the regulation in Arsenic (100,000)) is tantamount to
forcing each risk-bearer to invest more in their own safety than
they would rationally wish to, thereby violating each risk-bearer’s
autonomy.267 This was the fundamental point established in Part
II.
However, where those exposed to the risk do not bear the
costs of regulation (as is true in the case of the typical workplace
risk), whether or not the regulation is cost-justified seems to have
no independent normative significance. That is, where workplace
risks are concerned, there does not seem to be a normative basis
for basing regulatory decisions on a comparison between the total
cost of a proposed regulation and the total amount risk-bearers
would collectively be willing to pay for the risk reduction the
regulation accomplishes. In the case of a workplace risk, a
comparison of this kind is a poor indicator of whether a particular
regulation would promote autonomy, equity, overall well-being,
or any other norm.
To illustrate, consider a workplace risk scenario that is
identical to Chromium (200,000), except that, instead of being
distributed among 100,000 consumers, regulatory costs are
distributed among 1 million consumers. (Call this Chromium (1.1
million)). This reflects a situation that often occurs in the real
world, where the number of people on which a workplace risk
falls is just a small fraction of the number of the people among

265. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
266. See supra text immediately following note 12 (describing cost-justified and
providing an example).
267. See supra Part II.D.
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whom the costs of risk-reducing regulation are spread.268 The
chart below illustrates the individual and aggregate burdens
associated with each regulatory option. Notice that each
consumer’s burden is 10% the size of the corresponding burden
in Chromium (200,000).
Chromium (1.1 million)
Regulatory
Action

No
regulation

Moderate
regulation

Aggressive
regulation

Each
Worker’s
Ex Ante
Burden
1 in
50,000
risk
(WTP
≥$180)
1 in
100,000
risk
(WTP =
$90)
No risk
(WTP =
$0)

Each
Consumer’s
Burden

Ex Post
Burden on
100,000
Workers

Total
Burden on
1 million
Consumers

$0

2 expected
deaths

$0

$4

1 expected
death

$4 million

$24

0 expected
deaths

$24
million

Choosing aggressive over moderate regulation is not costjustified here for the same reasons it was not cost-justified in
Chromium (200,000): it would mean imposing a $20 million
incremental cost in order to obtain a $9 million incremental
benefit (avoiding one additional premature death). However,
from the standpoint of equity, there is a significant difference
between Chromium (1.1 million) and Chromium (200,000).
Where regulatory costs are distributed among 1 million rather
than 100,000 consumers, a decision to regulate aggressively
rather than moderately would mean imposing an additional cost
of $20 on each consumer rather than an additional cost of $200.
268. See Waisman, supra note 19, at 1266, 1311, 1313.
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Because the resulting reduction in each worker’s risk of
premature death (from 1 in 100,000 to zero) is one for which a
worker would be willing to pay $90, the individual risk principle
would require aggressive regulation in Chromium (1.1 million).
From the standpoint of equity, each consumer can reasonably be
expected to bear the burden of an additional $20 cost so that each
worker can avoid a mortality risk imposition that is equivalent to
bearing a cost over four times as great ($90). Thus, although the
total cost of regulation is unchanged from Chromium (200,000),
equity here dictates a different regulatory result by virtue of how
the cost is distributed.
This shows that, when evaluating the regulation of
workplace risks from the standpoint of equity, what matters is an
individual-level comparison between the amount each cost-bearer
would have to pay to subsidize regulation and the amount each
risk-bearer would be willing to pay for the risk reduction the
regulation accomplishes. Because equity is a norm concerned
with the burdens and benefits experienced by each affected
individual,269 rather than burdens and benefits considered in the
aggregate, the type of comparison made in standard, VSL-based
CBA tells us nothing about whether a given regulation will or will
not promote equity.270 The reason aggressive regulation would
be inequitable in Chromium (200,000) was not that its $20 million
incremental cost exceeded its $9 million incremental benefit, but
rather that the $200 cost burden experienced by each consumer
exceeded the $90 each worker would be willing to pay for the
resulting risk reduction. When, in Chromium (1.1 million), the
same $20 million cost is distributed among a group of consumers
ten times as large, aggressive regulation becomes the equitable
result because the cost burden to each consumer falls to $20. The
comparison captured by standard VSL-based CBA—one between
a regulation’s total cost and the total amount risk-bearers would
collectively be willing to pay for the risk reduction the regulation
accomplishes—is irrelevant from the standpoint of equity.
But is this sort of comparison relevant from the standpoint
of some other norm? One might think that a comparison between
a regulation’s total cost and total monetized benefit would be

269. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
270. See supra Part I.A (explaining the comparisons made in the VSL calculations).
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relevant to the norm of overall well-being. After all, if a
regulation’s total cost exceeds its total monetized benefit, doesn’t
this show that overall well-being would be reduced were the
regulation enacted? For reasons explained above in Part II.B, it
does not. Standard CBA captures the welfare effects of the
regulation’s monetary cost and the regulation’s ex ante risk
reduction benefit reasonably well.271 It fails, however, to
persuasively capture the welfare effect of the regulation’s ex post
death avoidance benefit.272 For this reason, whether or not a given
regulation is cost-justified under VSL-based CBA is a poor
indicator of whether it would increase or decrease overall wellbeing on net.
Thus, where the regulation of workplace risks is concerned,
the dictates of standard, VSL-based CBA have little normative
significance. As the above analysis of Chromium (1.1 million)
illustrates, a workplace risk regulation that is not cost-justified
might still be morally justifiable on the basis of equity or overall
well-being.273 Although standard CBA does not reliably track
any norm, an individual-level comparison between each costbearer’s share of regulatory costs and each risk-bearer’s riskreduction benefit at least provides a reliable indication of what the
norm of equity would dictate in a given case. This suggests that,
where workplace risks are concerned, CBA should be modified
to focus on the type of comparison contemplated by the individual
risk principle: a comparison between the amount each cost-bearer
would have to pay to subsidize a given regulation and the amount
each risk-bearer would be willing to pay for the risk reduction the
regulation delivers. When regulators consider how stringently to
regulate a workplace mortality risk, this sort of comparison will
indicate when further regulation would be inequitable.
Individualized CBA reliably tracks the norm of equity. By
contrast, when it comes to workplace risks, standard CBA is a
decision procedure in search of a normative basis.

271. See supra Part II.B.
272. See supra Part II.B.
273. See supra text accompanying note 260.
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CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued for the importance of taking
moral context into account in regulating industrial mortality risks.
Making mortality risk regulation sensitive to moral context means
distinguishing sharply between cases in which the costs of
regulation are borne by the same people who are exposed to the
risk (consumption risks) and cases in which such costs are borne
by others (workplace risks). Where consumption risks are
concerned, the norm of personal autonomy provides a basis for
using the VSL as a guide for risk regulation. In this moral context,
following the dictates of standard, VSL-based CBA ensures that
each risk-bearer is made to invest as much, but no more, in their
own safety as they would rationally wish to. Where workplace
risks are concerned, the norm of equity provides a basis for using
individual willingness-to-pay, though not the VSL, as a guide for
risk regulation. In that moral context, standard VSL-based CBA
has no clear normative basis and should be subordinate to the
individualized form of CBA represented by the individual risk
principle.
What consumption risks and workplace risks have in
common is that in both cases risk-bearers benefit meaningfully
from the industrial activity that creates the risk. This shapes the
moral context in two important ways. First, it makes the risk
imposition itself morally defensible on the grounds that the
imposition works to the ex ante advantage of those imperiled.
Second, in cases where risk-bearers do not bear the costs of
regulation, it provides a moral basis for limiting regulatory costs
in an equitable manner.
Unlike consumption and workplace risks, environmental
risks often fall on persons who neither benefit meaningfully from
the industrial activity giving rise to the risk nor bear any
appreciable share of the costs of reducing the risk. For example,
the subsistence fishermen exposed to a small risk of death from
eating fish filled with toxic chemicals deposited into fishing
streams by nearby paper and pulp mills may not benefit in any
meaningful way from the activity of paper production.274 Two
274. See generally National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504 (Apr. 15, 1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63, 261, 430).
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basic questions arise in this moral context. First, under what
circumstances if any is it morally permissible to impose a risk of
death on one group of people for the sake of providing a benefit
to a different group of people? Second, assuming there are
circumstances in which it permissible to imperil the lives of some
in order to benefit others, is it morally defensible to use the VSL
or willingness-to-pay as a guide for risk regulation in such
circumstances?
In future work, I hope to take up these questions.
Tentatively, while it is possible to conceive of circumstances in
which it would be morally permissible to impose a risk of death
on some for the sake of benefitting others, it is far from clear that
these circumstances actually obtain in the case of most
environmental risks. And even where such circumstances do
hold, using a VSL or the general concept of willingness-to-pay to
guide risk regulation would not seem to be defensible on the basis
of overall well-being, personal autonomy, equity, or any other
norm.

